Ānandavardhana

K. Kunjunni Raja

Sahitya Akademi

Ānandavardhana (820AD-890 AD), universally acclaimed as the most outstanding and influential critic in India, flourished in Kashmir in the second half of the ninth century under the patronage of king Avantivarman. His epoch-making work, the *Dhvanyaloka,* set the proper foundation for literary criticism and inspired all later poets and critics. The monograph in seven chapters gives a detailed study on Ānandavardhana's life and works; his status as a poet; the *dhvani*-theory; *vyañjana*-the language of poetry; and some concepts like *pratibhā*, *sahrdaya*, *acutiya*, *alamkāra*, *sanghatana*, gūṇibhūtā vyangya etc.

K. Kunjunni Raja (1920-2005) was a profound scholar in Sanskrit and a prolific writer in Malayalam and English. He has served as professor of Sanskrit in Madras University. A Senior Fellow, Dravidian Linguistic Association. His thesis, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, is considered as one of the best works in that area. He has authored around 30 books, and more than 200 research papers, and his books include the much acclaimed *The Philosophy of the Grammarians* (with Harold Coward) and *The contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit literature*. Kunjunni Raja was also the moving spirit behind compiling the early volumes of *The New Catalogus Catalogorum*, a remarkable ongoing project in manuscripts research. He was also the recipient of the 'President of India award' for outstanding contribution to Sanskrit.

After retiring from the Sanskrit department of the University of Madras, in 1980, he was associated with the Adyar Library and Research Centre, in Madras, run by the Theosophical Society. As honorary director of this institute, Kunjunni Raja also served as the chief editor of *Brahmavidya*, one of the leading international journals in Indology.

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ĀNANDAVARDHANA

The sculpture reproduced on the endpaper depicts a scene where three soothsayers are interpreting to King Suddhodhana the dream of Queen Maya, mother of Lord Buddha. Below them is seated a scribe recording the interpretation. This is perhaps the earliest available pictorial record of the art of writing in India.

From : Nagarjunakonda, 2nd century A. D.
Courtesy : National Museum, New Delhi

Makers of Indian Literature

ĀNANDAVARDHANA

K. Kunjunni Raja

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Preface

Ānandavardhana, poet, philosopher and critic, who flourished in Kashmir in the second half of the ninth century under king Avantivarman, is universally acclaimed as the most outstanding and influential literary critic of India. Accepting Bharata's *rasa* theory, originally intended for the theatre, to pure literature as well, Ānanda accommodated all the earlier concepts like *alaṁkāra, guṇa, rīti, saṅghaṭanā* etc., into a connected whole, with *rusa* as the nucleus, and all other concepts as subordinate to it. The theory of meaning was also enlarged to comprehend subtle suggestions, emotional factors and socio-cultural significance as part of meaning. Besides the primary meaning *(abhidhā)* and secondary meaning *(lakṣaṇā/gauṇī),* Ānanda accepted a third potency for language, namely suggestion *(vyañjanā). Rasa* is the content of poetry, and suggestion *(vyañjanā dhvani)* the method of communication. His *dhvani* theory, emphasizing *rasa* and the suggestive function of language, created a sort of revolution in poetics. Attack came immediately from critics and philosophers. Nobody questioned the importance of *rasa;* but philosophers were not willing to accept suggestion

(vyañjanā) over and above the primary and secondary significative power of words; some wanted to include it under *lakṣanā,* others felt it could be a special type of inference, while some thought that it could be included under *vakrokti* indirect expression. Ānanda did not attack the philosophers. In a polite and persuasive manner he tried to show that a sort of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought – *Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa* and *Sāhitya.* His *dhvani* theory is *vyañjanā* applied to literature, where the content is mainly *rasa.* Abhinavagupta whose *Locana* commentary is logical, systematic and authoritative, supported Ānanda's theory. Later Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* established the theory irrefutably.

Ānanda is attracting and inspiring modern critics in the East and the West. Prof. Ingalls says edition of the English translation of *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana* commentary is an epoch-making event. Prof. K. Kamimura of Tokyo University has translated *Dhvanyāloka* into Japanese. Prof. Ingalls says (p.38) : "There is nothing in our Western classical (Greek and Latin) tradition of criticism that corresponds to *rasa* and nothing that corresponds to *dhvani* in the grand dimension in which Ānanda and Abhinava conceived it."

Ānandavardhana wrote many poems in Sanskrit and Prakrit; but they are all lost; only his *Devīśataka* is extant: even that is almost unknown. His fame rests on the *dhvani* text, now known as *Dhvanyāloka,* but referred to by Abhinavagupta as *Kāvyaloka* and *Sahṛdayaloka.* In 1973 I published an anonymous text under the title *Dhvanyālokasaṅgraha* giving a summary of chapters I and II of *Dhvanyāloka* in 105 *anuṣṭubh* verses. The edition was based on a paper transcription of a Malayalam palm leaf manuscript originally belonging to the Paliyan family. The

sañgraha calls itself *Dhvanisaṅgraha.*` is possible that the title *Dhvanyālokasaṅgraha* was given to it by the scribe. So my assumption that here is an evidence for *dhvani* text having been called *Dhvanyāloka* at least a few centuries ago might be wrong.

I am thankful to the Sahitya Akademi for inviting me to write this book on Ānandavardhana. I hope that it will help the general readers to know something about the greatness of Ānandavardhana.

K. Kunjunni Raja

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Contents

Ānandavardhana : Life and Works

Ānandavardhana, who flourished under the patronage of king Avantivarman of Kashmir in the second half of the ninth century, is the most outstanding, original and influential literary critic of India. His epoch-making work, now known as Dhvanyāloka, set the proper foundation for literary criticism, and inspired all later poets and critics in India. His main contribution in the field is the establishment of the dhvani-theory laying importance to suggestion in all types of literature. This theory has two parts, a theory of poetic language and a theory of poetic content. He correlated Bharata's *rasa* theory to his *dhvani*-theory and applied it to all types of literature. The theory has inspired many modern critics in the west who are trying to see how far the *dhvani* theory can solve many of the unsolved problems that have been agitating their minds for centuries.

Ānandavardhana was known as a poet even during his life time and was referred to as a *kavi* Kalhaṇa, the great historian of Kashmir, refers to him as *kavi(kavirānandavardhana)*. Jayantabhaṭṭa, the well-known logician who was a contemporary of Ānanda also calls him a poet with whom no serious

philosophical and technical problems can be discussed. (athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhih saha Śobhate). Ānanda wrote poems in Sanskrit and Prakrit, besides some stray verses, though many of them are lost. Only his *Dhvanyāloka* and a short *stotra* poem on *devī (Devīś alaka)* are now available. Ānanda was well-versed in all the classical literature of his time, both Sanskrit and Prakrit and quotes relevant passages from them while discussing his *dhvani* theory. He proclaims that his *dhvani*-theory is mainly based on the classical works of Vālmīki, Vyāsa, Kālidāsa and others and that he is exposing what was really meant by them. *Kashmir* had been the centre of active discussion on problems of literary criticism from the time of king Lalitāditya; scholar critics like Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa and contributed much in the field. Though Ānandavardhana did not write a commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the *rasa-theory* of Bharata influenced him very much. In one sense we can say that Ananda's *dhvani*-theory is an attempt to use the rasa-theory to all types of literature. Ānanda was a good scholar in all systems of Indian Philosophy, Hindu as well as Buddhist. He tries to show that his *dhvani*-theory has the support of all the schools of thought-Grammarian. Mīmāṁsakas, Logicians and Ālaṁkārikas.

Life and Works

Ānandavardhana was a Kashmirian poet-critic who flourished under king Avantivarman in the second half of the ninth century. We get some reliable information about the life and works of Ānandavardhana from Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (5.34). According to this Muktākaṇa, Śivasvāmin, Poet Ānandavardhana and Ratnākara flourished under king Avantivarman of the Utpala dynasty, of Kashmir (A.D. 855-84). Of these four poets Muktākaṇa's works are lost. Śivasvāmin is the author of the Buddhist *mahākāvya, Kapphiṇābhyudaya.* Ratnākara is the author

of the *Haravijaya,* a *mahākāvya* on the exploits of Lord Śiva in fifty cantos, perhaps the longest *mahākāvya* in Sanskrit. He has also written a short poem *Vakroktipañcāśikā* in fifty verses indulging in poetic conceit of the *vakrokti* type.

Of Ānandavardhana's family what we know definitely is that he was the son of Noṇa and that he had the title of 'Rājānaka". The concluding verses of his poem *Devīśataka* give this information in a *cakrabandha* form of *citrakāvya;* the inner ring of the wheel gives the following message; 'The son of Noṇa has performed the worship of the Goddess under the title *Devīśataka* (Hundred verses on the Goddess) as instructed by her in a dream, a worship unmatched since it was according to her instruction (Verse 101). The title 'Rājānaka' suggests that he was patronized by the king, perhaps by the award of some pension. Ānandavardhana refers to a contemporary critic of the *dhvani*-theory whom Abhinavagupta identifies as 'Manoratha': this cannot be the poet of that name mentioned by Kalhaṇa (4.497), for that poet was patronized by king Jayāpīḍa much earlier. Avantivarman was a tolerant king who encouraged and partronized poets of different religions – Buddhists and Hindus (both *Śaivites* and *Vaiṣṇavas).* Ānandavardhana too was quite tolerant in his religious attitude; he wrote poems on Devī, Viṣṇu in his *Narasiṁha* form. Viṣṇu, in his *anantaśayana* form, Rādhā, and Kṛṣṇa. He was also well-versed in Buddhist thought. He quotes a line form Diṅnāga *(nārtthān śabdāh spṛśanty amī.* p. 519. Banaras edn. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* : also quoted by Uṁveka in his commentary on the *slokavārttika,* p. 61, Madras University edn.). He has also quoted a verse *anadhyavasitāvagāhanam ...'* occurring at the end of the *Parārthānumāna* section (v. 286) of the *Pramāṇavārttika* this is to prove that the popular verse *'lāvanyadraviṇavyayo na gepitah...'*must be by Dharmakīrti himself, since the same idea occurs in both. Ānandavardhana

3

has also written a commentary on Dharmottara's *ṭīkā* on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti.

Works

The most important and influential work *of* Ānandavardhana is the basic text on *dhvani-theory,* well-known as *Dhvanyāloka,* whose real title seems to have been something different. None of the manuscripts available refers to that name; *Sahṛdayāloka* and *Kāvyāloka* are found referred to in manuscripts: commentators like Abhinavagupta and critics mention one or the other of the two titles. "What is the use of *āloka* (light) without *locana* (eye)" asks Abhinavagupta in his *locana* commentary. Towards the end of the commentary he refers to the text as *Kāvyāloka.* In the course of his commentary and in the *Abhinavabhāratī* commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* he uses both the terms *Kāvyāloka* and *Sahṛdayāloka.* Since *Dhvanyāloka* is the name by which the work is now known, we may continue to use it for the time being.

The *Dhvanyāloka* is in four sections called *uddyotas.* It is in the form of *kārikās* and their explanation called *vṛtti.* Towards the end of the first *uddoyta* of the work. Abhinavagupta says that Ānandavardhana is the name of the author of the *vṛtti,* which contains a veiled reference to the name *(ānando manasi labhatām pratiṣṭhām).* Ānandavardhana is mentioned as *dhvanikāra, dhvanikṛt* etc., by later writers also. Since there is no serious difference in the views given in the *kārikās* and (the *vṛtti* it seems natural to assume that both are by Ānandavardhana himself.

Scholars like Buhler, Jacobi, Keith and Kane had considered the *kārikākāra* and *vṛttikāra* as different authors. Others like S. Kuppuswami Sastri and A. Sankaran considered them as identical. The later view has been ably defended by K. Krishnamoorthy

and Salkari Mookerji though attacked by P.V. Kane. In the *Abhinavabhāratī* (Vol. II pp. 299-300) Abinavagupta ascribes two of the *kārikās* of the text to Ānanda, as pointed out by Sankaran himself. It is now clear that Abhinavagupta had only distinguished the different functions of the same author. Prof. Ingalls in his recent edition of the translation of the text and *locana* commentary also accepts this view. The problem can now be considered as solved.

Another work of Ānandavardhana that is now available is the *Devīśataka* published in the *kāvyamāla* series *(Gucchaka 9)*. It consists of 104 verses on the Goddess; it is full of *yamaka* and *citrabandhas*. It may seem strange that Ānanda who cautions poets against indulging in *tour de force* of the type of *yamaka* should have written such a poem seriously. Perhaps the answer to this is given by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Ghaṭakarparakāvya,* traditionally ascribed to Kālidāsa. He says that the caution is to the budding poets who would require a special effort to abide by the rules of *citrakāvyas,* which may affect that poet's concentration on *the rasa*. Prof. Ingalls defends Ānandavardhana's yamaka-poem saying that 'the *yamakas* of the poem are musical and the *citrabandhas* extremely clever; he includes *Deviśataka* among the better *citrakāvyas* (p. 12).

Viṣamabāṇalilā 'Sports of Cupid' is a narrative poem (or a play) written in *mahārāṣṭrī prākṛt*. Four quotations are available; there are also some remarks about the subject-matter. The verses are examples of different types of suggestion. It seems that the work was written for the instruction of poets. He must have chosen the Piakrt language, since it was the vehicle of popular suggestiveness as exemplified in Hāla's *Saptaśatī*.

Arjunacarita, 'The Adventures of Arjuna' is a non-extant Sanskrit *mahākāvya.* Ānanda says that in this poem he changed the traditional story and included new material invented by

himself. Ānanda held the view that using Paurāṇic themes the poet should not alter them indiscriminately, and approved the view of king Yaśovarman, author of the *Rāmābhyudaya.* *('kathāmārge na cātikramah').* In the *Arjunacarita* the changes and additions are without affecting the intended emotion in the context.

The *Tattvāloka* is a philosophical work of Ānanda which is known only from Abhinavagupta's reference to it. It seems to have dealt with both metaphysics and literature.

Another book of Ānanda is a sub-commentary *(vivṛti)* on Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya.* Ānanda refers to his intention to write a book examining the doctrines of the Buddhists. This commentary is also not extant.

Ānanda has quoted some verses of his own in the *vṛtti* on the *Dhvanyāloka.* Some of them may be stray verses; some may be from his lost works.

Ānanda's Religion and Philosphy

Ānandavardhana was a pious Hindu with Vaiṣṇava leanings; he was a devotee of Viṣṇu; but he was tolerant towards others also; as is clear from his *Devīśataka* and his quotations of verses praising Śiva. On the basis of the term *pratyabhijñeyau* used in the *Dhvanyāloka* some scholars like K.C. Pandey have considered him to have had leanings toward the *Pratyabhijñā* school of Kashmir Śaivism. This is not correct; the term is used only in the sense of recognition (with respect to the words and their meanings in a poem).

In the fourth *uddyota of* the *Dhvanyāloka,* Ānanda tries to establish that *śānta* is the main *rasa* of the *Mahābhārata,* when viewed as a literary work. If viewed as a *śāstra* (philosophical work), *mokṣa* would be the *puruṣārtha* aimed at in that work. The *Mahābhārata* can be viewed both as a *śāstra* and as

literature. Ānanda quotes the authority of the *Gītā* (7.19) to show that Vāsudeva is identical with *Para-Brahman.*

'At the end of many births, the man of knowledge will come to me, knowing that Vāsudeva is universal'. He accepts the *vibhūtiyoga* of the *Gītā* emphasizing the view that the power of gods; places of pilgrimage and asceticism are epiphanies of Brahman. Vāsudeva, son of Vāsudeva born at Mathura, was an incarnation of Brahman, the eternal entity and is referred to as identical with Brahman. That eternal Vāsudeva *(vāsudevah sanātanah)* is the main character of the *Mahābhārata.*

2

Ānandavardhana as a Poet

Ānandavardhana was well-known as a poet even during his life time. Kalhaṇa refers to him as Ānandavardhana, the poet *(kavir ānandavardhana)*. The great logician Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Nyāymañjari* who wanted to reject his *dhvani*-theory said, "There is no meaning in discussing philosophy with a mere poet" *(athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhih saha śobhate)*. Ānanda was fully equipped for his literary career. He was a deep scholar in Sanskrit grammar, Mīmāṁsā and Logic. As for literary criticism he had studied Bharata's *Nātyaśāstra*. Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* and the Kashmir *Ālaṁkārikas* Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa. Almost all the earlier poets, Sanskrit and Prākṛt were familiar to him. Vālmīki and Vyāsa, Kālidāsa, King Harṣa (author of the *Nāgānanda* and the *Ratnāvali)*, Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa (author of the *Veṇīsaṁhāra)*, Amaru, Bhartṛhari, Hāla (author of the Prākṛt poem *Gāthāsaptaśatī)*, Vākpati (author of Prākṛt work *Gauḍavaho)*, Mayūra (author of the *Sūryaśataka)* etc. In his *Dhvanyāloka* he quotes from all these authors. Also some other works which are not extant now, like the *Rāmābhyudaya* by king Yaśovarman. He quotes from Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* and *Kādambarī*.

The *vṛtti* portion of the *Dhvanyāloka* shows that Ānandavardhana is 'one of the great prose stylists of Sanskrit literature'. Professor Ingalls writes: "No matter how delicate or complex the subject, he is always clear. He varies his expression, so that no matter how often he comes back to the importance of *rasa* and *dhavni* he seems never to repeat himself, or becomes tedious, while the rhythm of his sentences give constant delight" (p. 12). In comparison with his prose, the *kārikās* do not rise to the same level.

The first *kārikā* is a bit confusing since the word *iti* is put in the wrong place: this is to start his work by introducing his main theory, by a sort of *mudrālaṅkāra, kāvyasyātmā dhvani.* Mahimabhaṭṭa has restructured the verse to make it clear *(kāvyasyātmetyamalanmtibhir yo dhvanir...)* The *kārikā* giving the definition of *dhvani,* contains grammatical mistake *arthaḥ śabdo vā vyaṅktaḥ);* the term *artha* is used three times in three different senses. Here Mahimabhaṭṭa points out ten mistakes. *Kārikā 2* is also clumsy: *(kāvyātmā...tasya bhedāvubhau)* literally it says that 'the soul of poetry has two divisions'. Later critics have found fault with this also. Abhinavagupta has tried to explain these as intended to suggest additional meanings. The analogy of the relation between the word meaning and the sentence meaning given in *kārikā*-1 to explain the relation between the literal meaning and the suggested meaning is rejected in *uddyota* III.

Samples from Ānanda's writings in Sanskrit and Prākṛt are given in Appendix II. Some notes about them follow :–

1. Introductory verse of *Dh. A*

   "May the claws of the Man-lion incarnation of Viṣṇu, Madhu's foe, assumed by his free will give you protection, the claws that surpassed the moon by their own brilliant splendour, and capable of cutting off the distress of his devotees."

The claws are ten in number, while the moon is only one. The moon's lustre is borrowed from the Sun, while that of the claws is their own and brilliant, without any black spot like the moon. Abhinavagupta says that it is an example of *vīrarasa*; but it is better to take it as having *bhakti* as the main *rasa*. *Chāyā* of the claw is explained as the shape by Abhinava; it can also mean splendour. *Bhakti* was not recognised as a *rasa* then.

2. "I have been trying to observe the whole world, using the two eyes, the imaginative insight of poets and the intellectual insight of philosophers, the one trying to give taste to feelings and the other showing objects as they are; and I am weary. Oh Lord Viṣṇu recling on the ocean. I have never found a joy which comes from devotion to you." (3.43b).

Dr. V. Raghavan has pointed out that the first three lines have been borrowed by the author of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha,* p.1521 *(JOR.* 13, part 2, 1936).

3. "These things which, appear beautiful, became fruitful when they become the object of vision at least for a moment of that eye-which in a world devoid of light has become equal, or even a bit less than equal, to the other parts of the body."

A poet can reveal the beauty of the world, only if he gets a patron who can appreciate his poetry; otherwise his poetic activity is in vain.

This verse is found in *Bhallaṭaśataka,* 68, but Ānandavardhana quotes it as his own poem.

4. "When the terrible sound of Arjuna's bow was heard, there was great panic in the city of the demons. On

hearing that sound, the life of all the women of the demons became loose with the knot of base slipping down."

The context is the victorious march of Arjuna to the *pātāla* region.

5. "Poetic beauties grow when they arc admired by men of taste; a lotus become a *lotus* when it is blessed by the rays of the sun."

6. The hearts of the demons bent on snatching away the gems which were born along with the Goddess Lakṣmī (at the time of the churning of the milky ocean) were transferred by Lord Cupid (whose arrows are flowers) on the lips of their women.

(The suggested figure is simile)

Devīśataka

Verse 8. Read backwards becomes verse 9

Verse 10. Each of the four lines can be read forward and backward.

Verse 46. Only two letters *m* and *n* are used with the vowels in this verse.

Verse 59. Only two letters *t* and *v* are used in this.

Verse 104. The commentator Kaiyata says that Ānanda was the son of Noṇa, and that he had written *Arjunacarita* and *Viṣamabāṇalīlā* earlier.

Verse 101. The name of the poem and that of Ānanda's father are mentioned here.

3

The Dhvani-Theory

What is Dhvani?

Ānandavardhana starts his work with the motto *kāvyasyātmā dhvani (Dhvani* is the soul of poetry). Then to remove all confusion about the new concept, and to give pleasure to the sensitive readers he defines *dhvani* as 'that type of poetry where the expression and the literal meaning keep themselves subordinate and reveal the suggested meaning which is the most important'. He has also stated that the soul of poetry is that suggested meaning *(pratīyamānārtha).* Later he gives the full definition of *dhvani* as that where the predominant suggested sense is revealed clearly (2.33).

How can a *type of poetry* be the *soul* of poetry? Abhinavagupta explains that the term *dhvani* can be interpreted in five different ways; the suggestive expression, the suggestive literal meaning, the suggested meaning, a type of suggestive poetry and the function of suggestion. Of these Ānandavardhana seems to have used the term in the sense of suggested meaning and the type of suggestive poetry. The importance to the function *(vyāpāra)* was taken up more seriously later by Bhaṭṭanāyaka,

Abhinavagupta and others. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's attack on the *dhvani* theory is on the assumption that it is the *vyāpara* or function. Mahimabhaṭṭa's attempt to prove that all types of *dhvani* come under *anumāna* (inference) show's that he took *dhvani* as a *vyāpāra.* So the main problem now is whether *dhvani* is a function *(vyāpāra)* or the suggested meaning. Ruyyaka has stated clearly that Ānandavardhana took the suggested meaning as the soul of poetry, whereas Kuntaka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka took the *vyāpāra* (function) as the most important. Generally only three senses are ascribed to *dhvani* – the suggestive operation, the suggested meaning and suggestive poetry. Ānandavardhana was often vague in his statements, for he was more interested in getting the approval of all critics to his theory of *dhvani.* It may be noted that he does not use the term *dhvani* at all, when he distinguishes between the literal meaning and the implied meaning *(pratīyamānārtha).* After establishing the distinction between the two Ānandavardhana says that the real soul of poetry is *that implied meaning.*

Ānanda says that the literal meaning is only a fact *(vastu)* whereas the implied meaning *(pratīyamānārtha)* can be a fact, a figure of speech or an emotion. Though this is theoretically correct, Ānanda suggests, and Abhinavagupta explains, that the real soul of poetry is *rasa, bhāva* etc., for it is given by Ānanda immediately before the statement that 'the soul of poetry is *that* meaning'; the example of the origin of the *Rāmāyaṇa* due to the inspiration received by Sage Vālmīki on seeing the tragic death of the *krauñca* bird at the hands of the hunter *(śoka* leading to *śloka),* is also suggestive of the prominent nature of *rasa-dhvani.* In the classification of *dhvani,* the suggestors and the suggested meanings play important roles, but when he has to meet the arguments of the anti-*dhvani* critics, he speaks of the *vyañjanā.*

Dhvani and Mīmāṁsā

Ānanda tries to show that his doctrine of *Dhvani* is in harmony with the views of the *Mīmāṁsakas* who believe that the Vedic texts are *apauruṣeya* (independent of human author) and that the relation between a word and its meaning is inborn and permanent. To distinguish ordinary sentences based on the intention of the speaker from the vedic sentences where the author is not involved, the *mīmāṁsakas* have to accept some kind of *aupādhika* element in human sentences which make them liable to be erroneous. This accidental property (*aupādhikadhama*) is nothing but suggestion, according to Ānanda. Human sentences reveal a human intention *(puruṣābhiprāya):* this is through suggestion whether this kind of suggestion is useful in poetry is a different question. What is sought to be established is that *mīmāṁsakas* have to accept a sort of suggestiveness in human sentences, making them liable to be false. This does not mean that *vyaṅgyah vyañjaka* relationship is the same as cause and effect relationship.

Classification of Dhvani

Ānandavardhana classified *dhvani* into two main types: *avivakṣitavācya* where the literal meaning is not the one intended and *vivakṣitañyaparavācya* where along with the literal meaning something more is intended. This corresponds to the *lakṣaṇāmūla* and *abhidhāmūla* of later writers. The first type is again subdivided into two: (1) *atyantatiraskṛtavācya* where the literal meaning is completely rejected as in 'the mirror *blinded* by breath' and 'the sky with *intoxicated* clouds'; and (2) *Arthāntarasaṁkratmitavācya* where the literal sense is shifted to something else. The latter comes under 'pregnant use' as in 'I am *Rāma,'* 'Lotus flowers become *lotus flowers* when they are

blessed by the rays of the sun', and 'Both the cuckoo and the crow are black', but when the spring season comes the crow is a *crow,* and the cuckoo a *cuckoo.'* The second main type is also divided into two subdivisions: (a) *Asamlaksyakramavyaṅgya* where the suggested elements are emotional factors, and where the sequence between hearing the expression and enjoying the aesthetic emotion is not discernable; what is suggested in this type of *dhvani* can be any of the *rasas, bhāvas, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa* etc, (2) *Samlaksyakramavyaṅgya* where the sequence is perceptible. This is of three varieties: (1) based on the expression. (2) based on the literal sense; and (3) based on both.

This classification of *dhvani* is on the basis of the *vyañjakas* or suggestors. *Śabdaśaktimūla* is based primarily on the power of the expression, while *arthaśaktimūla* is based on the content. Later writers have added a third variety, *ubhayaśaktimūla*, based both on the *śabda* and the *artha. Śabdaśaktimūla* involves double entendre; there is difference of opinion among commentators regarding this variety, since Ānandavardhana's text is a bit ambiguous. According to Ānanda this type applies only where figures of speech are involved; but Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa accepted even *vastu* (idea) as coming under this type. In the case of double entendre where two kinds of meaning are conveyed, one contextual and the other non-contextual; the non-contextual ideas are prevented from being grasped, because of restriction by contextual factors and only the contextual meaning is expressed directly. The understanding of the non-contextual meaning is attributed to suggestion in such cases by Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. Ānandavardhana considers both meanings as got through the primary denotative power itself; and the figure of speech like simile or contrast is conveyed by the suggestive power of the expression. Jagannātha Paṇḍita has

Ānandavardhana

rightly rejected this view of Mammaṭa that the non-contextual meaning is conveyed by suggestion; for all the senses in such cases are conveyed through the power of *abhidhā* itself, Contextual factor can only restrict its application; they cannot deprive it of its primary senses. So there is no necessity to bring in *vyañjanā* in such cases. It is only the figure of speech like simile or contrast revealed from the juxtaposition of the two sets of primary meaning, one contextual and the other non-contextual, that is conveyed through suggestion. If both the meanings are contextual or non-contextual it is a case for the *śleṣa* or *double entendre*.

Arthaśaktumūla type of *dhvani* is based on the expressed meaning; the suggested meaning in this case can be a fact, a figure of speech or emotions and transient feelings. Thus there can be three varieties of this type - vastudhvani, *alaṁkāradhvani* and *rasādidhvani*. There is also a combination of the two: *śabdarthumūla*, based on both the expression and the literal meaning.

The *arthaśaktimūla* type of *dhvani* can be divided into two varieties: *svataḥ-sambhavī* or feasible in itself and *prauḍhoktimātranispannaśarīra* based on imagination and poetic fancy; the latter can be the fancy of the poet or that of a character created by the poet *(kavinibadhavaktrpraudho-ktimātranispannaśarīra* and *kavipraudhoktimālranispannaśarīra).*

I. Avivakṣītavācya

(Lakṣaṇamūla, where the literal sense is not intended.)

(a) *Atyantatiraskṛtavācya* (Literal sense completely set aside-based on Jahallakṣaṇa)

(b) *Arthāntarasamkramitavācya* (pregnant use where the literal meaning is shifted)

16

II *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya*

(Abhidhāmūla - Literal sense intended, but sub-serves the implied sense)

(a) *Asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya*
(The sequence of understanding the literal sense and the suggested sense is imperceptible)
(rasa, bhāva etc.).

(b) *Saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya*
(Where the sequence is perceptible) (Here the suggestion can be an experession, the literal meaning or both).

4

Ānandavardhana and Aesthetics

Ānandavardhana's main contribution in the field of literary criticism is accepted to be the establishment of the *dhvani* theory laying importance to the suggested meanings in literature. But the establishment of the *dhvani* theory was only a preliminary step (on the *vācya* level), for establishing (on the *vyaṅgya* level), something more fundamental and essentially important. That is *rasa*.

In the fourth *uddyota* of his book Ānandavardhana makes an important statement to the effect that all great thinkers convey their intrinsically essential ideas only through suggestion and never directly and bluntly (p.533). If we take this statement seriously — and there is no reason why we should not—we will have to assume that the establishment of the *dhvani* theory which is ostentatiously purported to be the aim of his work is not the real aim, but only the foundation on which his real theory on literature is to be built through implication and suggestion.

Here an objection may be raised that in a technical or scientific dissertation the general convention is that at the beginning of the work itself the four basic points—

anubandhacatuṣṭya - are to be indicated : *viṣaya,* the topic dealt with, *adhikārins,* the fit persons for whom the book is intended, *prayojana,* the purpose or the expected result, and the *sambandha* or relationship between the topic and the book or the way of dealing with the topic adopted in the book. Ānandavardhana has stated that he is going to deal with *dhvani,* that the *adhikārins* are the *sahṛdaya-s* and would-be poets, and that their delight is the purpose.

This argument is valid to some extent, and we have to agree that Ānandavardhana wanted to establish the *dhvani* theory. But he did not wish to stop with that; he wanted to establish, in a subtle way through suggestion, something more vital. It must also be noted that Ānandavardhana is using the pedagogic approach in dealing with the topic of *dhvani.* There is a lot of repetition, apparent self-contradiction and persuasive appeal in the text. In the beginning he brings the analogy of *padārthaḥ vākyārtha-nyāya* to explain the relation between the expressed and the suggested; later in the third *uddyota* he says (p.419) that the analogy should not be taken literally, and what was meant was that one is a means for the other. The term *dhvani* is used for suggested sense, for the *vyañjanāvyāpāra* and for *dhvanikāvya* indiscriminately. First he defines *dhvani* in a rather inelegant way (1.13).

Later he adds another condition for the full definition (Last *kārikā* of second *uddyota).* He tries to build up his arguments by starting with some points acceptable even to the opponent; thus before stating that *Pratīyamānārtha* is the essential element in poetry, he starts with the point (1.2) which is generally acceptable to all, and then proves with ample illustrations that meaning in poetry is of two types *vācya* and *pratīyamāna;* the term *dhvani* is not at all introduced at this time. Thus it is clear that Ānandavardhana adopts a pedagogic approach and we need not therefore expect a fully śāstraic type of treatment in his work.

19

Now the question arises: if *dhvani* is not the essential and ultimate element of poetry intended to be defined, described with illustrations and thus established, what is the ultimate view suggested by Ānandavardhana through the *dhvani* theory? The answer is clear. It is the aesthetic theory of *rasa* as applied to literature. The contribution of Ānandavardhana in the field of aesthetics is of foremost importance and multifaceted, but does not seem to have received adequate attention even from specialists. In fact many of the popular views on aesthetics, often attributed to Abhinavagupta are taken directly or indirectly from Ānandavardhana, or evolved from hints given by him.

It was Ānandavardhana who for the first time pointed out clearly that emotional experiences can never be communicated merely by naming them, i.e. by repeating the terms referring to them, but have to be conveyed indirectly through the suggestive power of language, by describing the situational environment, by portraying the characters, their actions and reactions. Udbhaṭa seems to have believed that *svaśabdavācyatva* or referring to the name of the emotion is one of the means of conveying it, the other means being the description of *vibhāva, anubhāva* etc.

Ānandavardhana rejects this view and points out that an emotion can never be conveyed by merely naming it, that even in cases, where the name is used, it is only as an *anuvāda* and that the actual conveying of the emotion is only through suggestion, by indicating the *vibhāva's* etc. Later writers like Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and Jagannātha Paṇḍita considered *svaśabdavācyatva* a positive defect, though Ānandavardhana did not ban the use of names, but only considered it unnecessary. Emotions can never be evoked by merely naming them, but only by delineating the *vibhāva-s* etc. He proves it through the substitution method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka.* Hence *rasadhvani* etc., cannot be *vācya* or the direct object of language perception.

The *abhivyaktivāda* of aesthetic experience generally ascribed to Abhinavagupta is foreshadowed in the *dhvani* theory of *Ānandavardhana,* asserting that *rasa* etc., can be communicated only through suggestion or *vyañjanāvyāpāra.* Though Bhaṭṭanāyaka later tried to be little the importance of the role of suggestion and explained the process of communication of the aesthetic experience from the poet to the reader by introducing two new funtions to literary language— *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva,* the former helping in the universalization of the emotions by stripping them of all personal associations and the latter helping in the easy enjoyment of them by the *sahṛdayas;* all later writers from Abhinavagupta onwards have accepted the stand taken by Ānandavardhana and considered *vyañjanā* or suggestion as an independent function of poetic language by means of which aesthetic experience is communicated from the poet to the *sahṛdaya* reader. To the objection raised by Bhaṭṭanāyaka the suggestion can reveal only what is already existent in a place and cannot convey the *rasa* from the poet to the reader, Abhinavagupta replied by pointing out that the locus of *rasa* is the heart of the *sahṛdayas* themselves, and that poetry is a sort of stimulus which helps the readers to realize and enjoy the *rasa* innate in them potentially. Thus even though there is some basic difference in the positions taken by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, it is clear that the *abhivyakti-vāda* usually ascribed to the latter is a modified form of Ānandavardhana's *dhvani*-theory.

Ānandavardhana does not explicitly point out the exact locus of *rasa.* He seems to have held (he earlier view that primarily it is in the poet and that it is conveyed or transferred to the *sahṛdaya* through suggestion.

Abhinavagupta's clarification that it is not the grief of the sage only indicates that it was an *alaukika* type of universalized

śoka, and not the worldly grief. Abhinavagupta's statement that the locus is the mind of the reader was to meet the objection that suggestion or revelation cannot produce anything that is not already there.

The *vighnas* or the external and dispersive elements or obstacles that have to be removed before the perfect aesthetic experience is to be achieved, which form part of Abhinavagupta's theory of *rasa* realization are also foreshadowed in Ānandavardhana. Abhinava refers to seven *vighnas (Abhinavabhāratī* on VI.32 (p.280f)), most of them are suggested by Ānandavardhana, while dealing with *aucitya* or propriety (in the third *uddyota).*

It must, however, be noted that Ānandavardhana was not fully aware of the concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* or universalization, introduced for the first time by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. The spectator should not be conscious of any personal, private involvements while enjoying a piece of art; though actively participating in the situations and not at all being indifferent to it, the spectator is so thoroughly absorbed in the emotional situation depicted, and so fully immersed in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of everything else that he is not conscious of any personal considerations pertaining to himself. According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka this *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is effected by the *bhāvakatva-vyāpāra* or *bhāvanā* of the expression, by the introduction of *guṇas* and *alaṁkāras* in the case of poems and also through the four types of *abhinaya* in dramas. Bhaṭṭanāyaka also assumed a third function of poetic language, called *bhojakatva* which is the power for making the spectator enjoy the *rasa* revealed by the *bhāvanā vyāpāra.*

Ānandavardhana stressed the need for the *sahṛdaya* to rise to the level of the poet to appreciate and enjoy literature. He distinguished the scholar from the critic and maintained that

mere knowledge of grammar and prosody and the rules of interpretation is not sufficient to make a good *sahṛdaya:* aesthetic sensibility is to be acquired by constant practice at enjoying classical literature. Abhinavagupta's definition of a *sahṛdaya* is well-known.

Sahṛdayas are those whose mind has been polished by repeated study (and enjoyment) of classical masterpieces to such an extent that what is described in a poem will easily be reflected therein. Ānandavardhana's definition is more crisp: It is the capacity to respond properly to aesthetic stimuli. Ānandavardhana's criticism of Kālidāsa's depiction of intimate love scenes of the divine couple in the *Kumārasambhava* (canto VIII) seems to be partly due to his unawareness of the role of *sādhāranīkarana* in literature and art, presenting objects in a universalized form free from, personal involvement, for the ideal *sahṛdaya* must be able to enjoy aesthetic delight even from such scenes, since the universalized love sports of the divine couple would not have any jarring effect on his appreciation.

Ānandavardhana himself cautions critics not to be over-enthusiastic about *dhvani* (p.481). *Rasa* is the most important element; and the poet must concentrate on that, even though other types of *dhvani* are possible (IV.5). *Rasas* and *bhāvas* are the main themes for the activity of great poets. The main task of the poet is the delineation of *rasa* etc. His aim is to show that conscious delineation of *rasa* etc., is the main task of the poets and not merely the introduction of *dhvani* (p.364). A work devoid of *rasa* will make its author a poetaster and will merit only oblivion. Even the definition of a *sahṛdaya* is associated with the capacity to appreciate *rasa (rasajñatā).*

Though Ānanda classifies *dhvani* under three sections, *vastu, alaṁkāra* and *rasādi,* the last is the most important, and the other two ultimately lead to it. Abhinavagupta rightly reveals

23

Ānandavardhana's views, while explaining the line. The soul of poetry is that meaning, saying that strictly *rasa* alone is the Ātman, though literally *artha* means all the three including *vastu,* and *alaṁkarā;* for the immediately preceding line refers to *rasa,* and the succeeding illustration from the *Rāmāyaṇa* is also about *rasa* (1.5).

The clear-cut distinction between *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* as *uttama* and *madhyama* types of *kāvya,* unequivocally stated in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* and later works, is never specifically stated so by Ānandavardhana, though one may feel that it is implied therein. Suggested element adds to the beauty of a poem, whether that element is predominant or subordinate.

The same verse which exemplifies *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* can also be taken as a *dhvani* when viewed from the point of view of *rasa* (III.40). The oft-quoted dictum that importance is based on beauty admits beauty *or cārutva* even to *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya.* It is this equivocal stand that made Mahimabhaṭṭa question the *dhvani*-theory itself *(TSS.* ed. p.22). When Ānandavardbana distinguished *vācya* and *pratīyamāna* elements in poetic meaning, it was only for analytical purpose; absolute isolation of the two from each other is impossible; and both, together, can be the Ātman of poetry. This is suggested by the complicated construction of the introductory verse (1.2).

Ānandavardhana accepted, conditionally, the earlier views about the important elements of poetic embellishment like *alaṁkāra, guṇa, rīti* and *vṛtti.* They are acceptable provided they help in the evocation of the intended *rasa,* but only as the external paraphernalia. We might say that *rasa* is the electric current, which makes *alaṁkāra, guṇa* etc., shine properly; otherwise they will be like the bulb, fan, heater or fridge without the electric current.

Regarding the proper use of *alaṁkāras* in literature the *samīkṣāprakāra-s* enumerated and illustrated by Ānandavardhana are based on their usefulness in the delineation of *rasa* (11.17). In the case of *yamkas* and *citrabandhas,* a special effort is needed to produce them and to understand them. But in the case of *arthālaṁkāras* like *rūpaka* and *upamā,* it is not needed; in many cases they help in the evocation of *rasa* (pp.221-22). The *guṇas* are defined by Ānandavardhana as those aspects of *śabda* and *artha* which help in the evocation of the *rasa* : and directly and intimately connected with *rasa* (11.6). And he accepts Bhāmaha's threefold classification of *guṇas* as *mādhurya, ojas* and *prasāda.* The *doṣas* or defects are those elements which mar the effect of the *rasa* or stand in the way of their evocation (as explained by Mammaṭa later).

Aucitya or propriety to be observed in literature with regard to *saṅghaṭanā* etc. is normally from the point of view of the evocation of the intended *rasa.* The propriety regarding *vṛtti's* is also on the basis of the *rasas* (111.33).

Thus every element of poetic embellishment revolves round the central concept of *rasa* which is the life of ātman of poetry according to Ānandavardhana.

The Concept of Aṅgī-Rasa

It was Ānandavardhana who for the first time enunciated and established the theory of *aṅgī-rasa,* which states that in a literary work-drama, epic or lyric, or even a stray verse-one of the *rasas* must be made predominant and the others kept subordinate to it, if the poet wants to achieve excellence (III.21).

Mutually conflicting or supplementing emotions can be delineated in a literary work properly and effectively provided one of the *rasas* is kept predominant throughout and the others kept as subsidiary in the background. Writers on literary criticism

who followed Ānandavardhana accepted this principle without any question as a universally accepted one, probably unaware of the fact that it was a unique contribution of Ānandavardhana. It was mainly as the propounder of the *dhvani* theory that Ānandavardhana was praised or criticised by later critics. Even modern writers of literary criticism have not given adequate attention to this aspect of his contribution to the *Aṅgi-rasa* concept.

The general view held by poets and playwrights as well as writers on literary criticism in India prior to Ānandavardhana was that a literary work must be truly representative of life and should be able to bring delight to people of different tastes; it must therefore deal with various *rasas*. This is much more applicable in the case of plays. The need for one of the *rasas* to be predominant leaving the others subordinate to it was not stressed by the early writers. Proclaiming the importance of *nāṭya,* Kālidāsa refers to it as having various *rasas* in order to please the audience consisting of people of varying tastes '*nānārasam.' (Mālavikāgnimitra* 1.4). Vālmīki says that his *Rāmāyaṇa* consisted of all the *rasas,* and does not say that *karuṇa* is the predominant *rasa* intended (1.4.9).

Bhavabhūti speaks about his drama *Mālatīmādhava* as containing several *rasas* (Act 1). Bhavabhūti's references to the *Rāmāyaṇa* as a *karuṇādbhuta* creation does not indicate his awareness of the *aṅgī-rasa* theory. His oft-quoted line in the *Uttatararāmacarita, eko rasaḥ karuṇa eva* (111.47), may indicate his partiality towards *karuṇa,* but not his acquaintance with the *aṅgirasa*-theory*;* moreover theoretically the main *rasa* in the *Uttararāmacarita* is *sambhoga sṛṅgāra* and not *karuṇa,* since there is no *ātyantikavināśa* or permanent loss of the *ālambanavibhāva* there, as pointed out by Kuntaka (p.276, *Vakroktitvita).*

26

In the *Nāṭyasāstra* Bharata says that a full-fledged *nāṭaka* should have various *rasas* and *bhavas* (19.12). However, he insisted that an element of surprise or *adbhuta rasa* should be introduced in the denoument or *nirvahaṇa*. Bharata wants a drama to entertain the audience consisting of different types of people with different tastes and therefore to have various *rasas,* including *adbhuta* at the conclusion. Just as a garland is made of different kinds of flowers properly arranged, a play must also have various *rasas*.

Regarding a *mahākāvya,* Bhāmaha's definition points out the need for representing the ways of the world and delineating all the rasas one by one: *Kāvyālaṁkara* (1.21).

Daṇḍin also says that it should necessarily delineate all the various *rasas* and *bhavas*. (1.18). No writer before Ānandavardhana has spoken about the need for one of the *rasa-s* to be made predominant, leaving others subordinate to it. Following the views of Ānandavardhana, the *Daśarūpaka* insisted that in a *nāṭaka, śṛṅgāra* or *vīra* should be the *aṅgī-rasa,* leaving the others subordinate to it, and giving scope for *adbhuta* at the end. Viśvanātha adds *śānta* also as a possible *aṅgirasa* for a *mahākāvya*. The rule that *vastu, netā* and *rasa* form the bases on which the different types of dramas are to be distinguished is also not found in early works, and comes for the first time only in the *Daśarūpaka* under the influence of Ānandavardhana.

The unity of objective or *kārya* was stressed by Bharata; this might imply unity of *rasa* also, but Bharata has not given any indication regarding the need for *aṅgī-rasa* in a play or a poem. Poets and playwrights earlier than Ānandavardhana could not possibly have been influenced by the theory of an *aṅgī-rasa.* Hence it is rather futile to attempt to find out the *aṅgī-rasa* in their works. Is *vīra* or *adbhuta* the main *rasa* in

27

Aścaiyacūḍāmani? *Is karuna* or *srṅgara* the main *rasa* in the *Uttararāmacarita*? Is there any unity of *rasa* in the *Nāgānanda* or the *Raghuvamśa* ? Questions like these have only an academic interest, since the writers of those works had no such theory of *aṅgī-rasa* before them. Even the attempt of Ānandavardhana to prove that *karuna* is the main *rasa* in the *Rāmāyana* and that *śānta* is the predominant *rasa* in the *Mahābhārata* is due to his desire to establish his theory about an *aṅgī-rasa* for *prabandha-s* and it is doubtful whether Vālmīki or Vyāsa had such an aim. Practice precedes theory and Ānandavardhana claims that his theory of *aṅgī-rasa* is based on the practice of master-poets and playwrights.

Ānandavardhana starts his argument with the established view that plays and poems must deal with various *rasas;* but he says that the principle of *aṅgāṅgi-bhāva,* one being made predominant and the others kept subordinate and subsidiary, should be strictly adhered to if real excellence is to be achieved. The introduction of other *rasas* will not mar the importance of the dominant *rasa,* if proper care is taken to see that they are not developed to the same extent as the main *rasa.* The principle of *sthāyibhāva-sañcāribhāva* relationship may be applied in the case of *rasas* also (111.22). Just as the need for the unity of plot is accepted by Bharata while discussing the development of the theme, in the case of *rasas* also one should be kept as the main and all-pervasive, the others being left subordinate to it (111.23). This rule applies to those naturally conflicting with the main *rasa* and to those which can easily play a supporting role.

Bharata seems to have felt that each character in a play may have one dominant emotion, but he did not consider the need for a predominant *rasa* for the work as a whole. Structural unity in plot was however stressed by him. Ānandavardhana perhaps felt that unity in theme implied a predominant *rasa* for the work as a whole, and that great classical writers have always taken this

for granted; so he boldly stated that even the construction of the plot must be made in such a way that there is scope for a predominant *rasa*. Incidents and descriptions irrelevant to the development of the main *rasa* should be avoided, and even the introduction of figures of speech and the selection of the texture of the work should be in keeping with the *rasa* delineated. In all such cases the propriety from the point of view of *rasa* is the most important factor to be taken into account (III.11-14).

The Kerala tradition of staging select acts of Sanskrit plays in *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* does not seem to accept the theory of *aṅgī-rasa* for an entire text; it seems to follow the ancient view that there must be scope for various *rasas* and *bhāvas* in a poem or play in order that it may be appealing to the people of varying interest. The later dance-drama *Kathakali* developed in Kerala by reforming the old *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* tradition is also giving full scope for more than one *rasa* in a play-usually *śṛṅgāra*, *vīra* and *raudra* in that order appearing in different scenes. The principle of *aṅgāṅgibhāva* is not strictly adhered to in these dance-dramas.

Ānandavardhana's arguments in favour of the *aṅgī-rasa* may be summarized thus:

1. The unity of plot, stressed by Bharata, implies the unity of *rasa* also.

2. We agree that a play or poem must deal with various *rasas* and *bhāvas*. But all of them cannot and need not be developed equally. One of them will be relatively more important than the others.

3. If the playwright carefully makes one of the *rasas* predominant, keeping the rest subordinate, it will add to the excellence of the work.

4. This *aṅgāṅgibhāva* among *rasas* will automatically eliminate the conflict between opposing *rasas*. All other

rasas, mutually opposing or complementary, will be subordinate to the main *rasa.*

5. If the term *rasa* is to be used only when the emotion is fully developed to the highest pitch, and *rasa* can never be subordinate. it may be assumed that here the term is used figuratively for *sthāyibhāva.*

6. The analogy of *sthāyi* and *sañcārī bhavas* may be applied to the main and subordinate *rasas.*

7. It is found that in classical works the principle of *aṅgīrasa* has been accepted by great poets: *karuṇa* is the *aṅgīrasa* in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *śānta* the main *rasa* in the *Mahābhārata.*

Śānta Rasa

Ānandavardhana's contribution to the establishment of *śānta* as an independent *rasa* is generally known, and has been dealt with in detail by Prof V. Raghavan in his *Number of Rasas.* The reference to *śānta* as the ninth *rasa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is a later interpolation as suggested by Abhinavagupta himself. According to Kālidāsa, Bharata had discussed only eight *rasas.* The *Ubhayābhisārikā of* Vararuci mentions *rasas* as eight. Daṇḍin too refers to eight *rasas.* The early Tamil tradition represented in the *Tolkāppiyam* also speaks of eight *rasas.* Bharata himself says that *ḍima* should not have *śṛṅgāra* and *hāsya,* but can have the other six *rasas.*

The earliest writer on poetics to mention *śānta* as a *rasa* is Udbhata in the eighth century. Ānandavardhana's serious attempt to prove its existence as a distinct *rasa* with *tṛṣṇākṣayasukha* as the *sthāyibhāva,* to show that the main *rasa* in the *Mahābhārata* is *śānta,* and to establish its distinction from *vira* saying that while *vīra* has *utsāha* or energy with the full development of the ego, *śānta* is characterized by the complete absence of ego,

proves that he was not aware of the spurious *śānta* passage in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The *Saundaryalaharī* has a reference to *śānta*, but its being a work of Śaṁkara is disputed. The Jain text *Anuyogadvārasūtra* ascribed to the fifth century A.D. contains a reference to nine *rasas,* including *praśānta* : Masson has suggested the possibility of later interpolation of the passage, since it is the only reference in Jain literature before the tenth century A.D. (*Śāntarasa,* p.37).

The importance of *rasa* through the development of emotional situations had been stressed much earlier in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* with special reference to the theatre and detailed directions regarding the communication of emotions by the actors had been given. Ānandavardhana accepted the importance of *rasa* in all literature, and evolved his theory to explain the communication of aesthetic experiences by the poet through the medium of language using the method of suggestion. The importance of *rasa* is accepted by all later critics including those who opposed *dhvani.*

Ānandavardhana's basic postulate is that *rasa* can be evoked only through suggestion, by describing the situations and contextual factors such as the reactions of the characters. Not only the literal and figurative senses, but also the suggestive possibilities of the expression such as the sound echoing the sense, rhythm, imagery and symbols, selective exaggeration of the prominent element and the suppression of the irrelevant, and bringing out the etymological significance through subtle suppletion—all these devices are to be selected from those in common usage in such a way as to help in evoking the emotional effect intended. *Rasa* is the pivot round which everything else revolves; it is the electric current that vivifies every element of poetic embellishment. In short Ānandavardhana's *dhvani-theory* is really a *rasa* theory developed in a subtle and effective manner.

5

Language of Poetry : Vyañjanā

Theory of Meaning

The theory of primary and secondary meaning developed by the *mīmāṁsakas* and the *naiyāyikas* in ancient India was further extended by Ānandavardhana to include emotive and other associative social-cultural meanings also under linguistic meaning. The basic *śabda-artha* relationship was accepted, without any question; but under *artha* or meaning Ānanda included not only the information conveyed, but also the social-cultural significance, the figures of speech and the emotion induced. Under *śabda* or the linguistic expression, he did not confine himself to the words and sentences but included all contextual factors, syntactic and situational the information and gestures, the sound effect produced, the rhythm and the metre as well as the literal sense. Though suggestion *(vyañjanā)* is an all-comprehensive linguistic phenomenon, Ānandavardhana confined his attention to poetic language and studied the problem only from that stand-point. Later writers like Kuntaka have also accepted the view that the *śabda* and *artha* in literature are more comprehensive than the same in ordinary parlance.

Normal discussions on language behaviour have been confined to the individual words and their isolated meanings. Centuries earlier than Ānandavardhana, Bhartṛhari, the great philosopher of language, had exposed the unsatisfactory nature of a linguistic theory depending entirely on individual words and their lexical meanings. He had shown that even in everyday life the meaning of an utterance depends on contextual factors, and that the logical interpretation of the sentence meaning on the basis of individual word meanings is defective in many cases. Often it seems futile to discuss the primary and secondary referents of an individual word; the sentence has to be taken as a whole and in the particular context in which it is uttered. Thus when a mother says to the child, 'The tiger eats children who cry', she does not mean that he will be eaten by the tiger, if he cries. What she means is that the child should not cry. Similarly if a traveller says to his companion in the morning "we must go; look at the sun", the real meaning is that it is getting late. Looking at the sun is not important. And when a child is told 'see that crows do not steal the butter' he knows quite well that he should not let a dog steal it *(Vākyapadīya* II. verses 322, 312, 314). To say that the word 'crow' means also a 'dog' and others who are likely to cat the butter seems far-fetched. In all such cases the whole utterance has to be taken in the given situation to get the proper meaning intended.

Bhartṛhari's influence on Ānandavardhana is much more than this. Even the term *dhvani* used for his theory is taken from that grammarian. Ānanda has acknowledged his indebtedness to the grammarians. He says that according to the *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari, the sound units or phonemes that suggest the whole word or sentence is called *dhvani* which is of two types, the *prākṛta dhvani,* or the primary sounds actually produced by the speaker, deprived of all linguistically irrelevant sounds and

vaikṛtadhvani or the actual sounds produced together with the irrelevant idiosyncratic elements due to the speaker.

Ānanda does not reject the earlier views of the grammarians, logicians and *mīmāṃsakas*. He accepts the usual division of speech utterrance into sentences and words and of the words into stems and suffixes; he also accepts the distinction between the primary and metaphorical senses of words. In addition to the primary and secondary significatory power of words, he postulates a third potency for words and sentences which he calls the suggestive power called *vyañjanā*. Over and above the literal and metaphoric meanings an expression can have a suggested meaning without cancelling the others. Ānanda's considered view is that in literature it is this suggested meaning that is more important than the others.

Logician's interested more in accuracy and precision in the use of words in a sentence which they want to analyse objectively than in the fullness of expression and the possibilities of extending the range of meaning to the domain of the inexpressible, are satisfied with the normal sense. But poets and critics, as well as philosophers and mystics, who deal with the totality of human experience cannot ignore vast areas of human behaviour. The suggested meaning may be too vague, fleeting and subjective to have a place in logical meanings; the subtle and subjective suggestions implied in language do not lend themselves to logical discussion and analysis. The suggested meaning depends on contextual factors, and the same utterance may convey different suggestions to different people depending on their mental make-up and expectations, as well as the contextual factors. There need not be any invariable connection between an expression and the suggestions conveyed. Wittgenstein said 'Whatever can be said, can be said clearly. And what we cannot speak out we must leave in silence' (*Tractatus)* Great poetry is

written on the fringe of silence; it aims at conveying the inexpressible by means of suggestion. Logicians may dismiss it altogether as unreal, or include a part of it in inference and reject the rest; but the poets and critics have to pay special attention to it, for the suggested sense plays an important role in poetry where the appeal is more to the emotion than to reason. A philosophy of language as that of Wittgenstein (in the *Tractatus)* which would eliminate whole areas of human discourse as meaningless and unintelligible has little significance for human culture.

Ānandavardhana included emotional factors evoked in the listeners under meaning. This naturally necessitates the assumption of a limitless suggestive power for language, and even logicians cannot argue that the emotions induced by language can be included under literal meaning. Emotions can be evoked by music or dance where no expressed sense is involved; the emotive element in a language cannot be explained in terms of the primary meaning or even the metaphorical sense of words.

Vyañjanā vṛtti

Though the importance of the suggestive power of language was known to all great poets and philosophers, as well as critics and truth-seekers from very early times, and references to the importance of the suggestive, function of language are found in ancient literature of India beginning from the *Ṛgveda,* it was Ānandavardhana, the ninth century poet-critic of Kashmir, who developed the theory of *vyañjanā* or suggestive function as part of his *dhvani*-theory, and successfully applied it to poetry and dramaturgy.

Over and above the primary denotative power *(abhidhā)* and the metaphoric transfer *lakṣaṇā,* Ānandavardhana posited a third

special function for language called *vyañjanā* or suggestion. The suggested meaning depends on contextual factors and there is no one-to-one correspondence between an expression and the possible suggested meanings. The primary meaning is the dictionary meaning; but the suggested meaning may change from context to context. The same expression may suggest different ideas to different persons in the same situation.

Language does not allow a vacuum in any field; every field is fully covered and represented by the number of terms occupying it, and the exact meaning of a term depends on the meanings of the terms occupying the same area. A word like *blue* means one thing in a language with six colour terms and a slightly different meaning in a language with only three or four colour terms. This is called the field theory of meaning in linguistics. Coming to the field of the functions *(vṛttis or vyāpāras)* of words, Sanskrit has seven different terms *abhidhā, laksaṇā, gauṇī, tātparya, bhāvakatva, bhojakatva* and *vyañjanā.* Not all schools of thought accept all of these. *Bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* are assumed by Bhaṭṭanāyaka for literature, the former to effect a universalization of the *vibhāva* etc., and the latter to the power of making the poem enjoyed by the readers. The *mīmāṁsakas* accepted *gauṇī vṛtti* depending on similarity or common quality between the literal meaning and the actual referent, as distinct from pure *laksaṇā* where the relation between the literal meaning and the actual reference is anything other than similarity. *Tātparya* is a *vṛtti* or *śakti* accepted by the *naiyāyika,* Jayantabhaṭṭa, to explain how the syntactic relationship between the word-meanings is effected; this is the same as *saṁsargamaryādā* suggested by the *navya nyāya* school. Ānandavardhana accepted *abhidhā* and *laksaṇā* accepted by all schools, to this he added the third fuction *vyañjanā* to explain aesthetic enjoyment.

It may be noted that all the anti-*dhvani* critics who came after Ānandavardhana were concerned with *dhvani* as a function *(vyāpāra),* which is the same as *vyañjanā vyāpāra.* Bhaṭṭanāyaka as quoted by Abhinavagupta in the *locana (KSRI ed.p.78)* is interested only in criticising the *dhvan-vyāpāra,* identified with *vyañjanā* (suggestive operation) and not with suggested meaning *(vyaṅgyārtha).* Mahimabhatta's criticism consists in trying to include this *dhvani-vyāparā* under inference. *(Vyaktiviveka* beginning: *'anumāne'ntarbhāvam sarvasyāpi dhvaneh prakāśayitum...').* Kuntaka did not reject *dhvani,* but tried to include *dhvanivyāpāra* under *vakrokti.* None of these deny the existence of an implied meaning different from the literal meaning. In the beginning of his work Ānanda tries to prove that *pratīyamānārtha* can exist in poetry, and that it is different from the literal meaning. He never uses the term *dhvani* at that time. It is easy to prove the existence of *pratīyamānārtha* : to show that this funtion of language is *dhvani* or *vyañjanā,* and cannot be included under inference, *vakrokti* etc., is more difficult.

Ānandavardhana has tried to show that *vyañjanā vyāpāra* exists and that it cannot be included under any other function like *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa,* or under inference.

To accommodate *vyañjanā,* Ānanda had to reduce the scope of *lakṣaṇā.* In the case of intentional *lakṣaṇā (prayojanavatī lakṣaṇā)* the purpose served by the metaphor was maintained to be outside the scope of *lakṣaṇā* , and within the function of *vyañjanā.* In the definition of *lakṣaṇā* itself the condition of incompatibility of the literal sense was taken to be *anvayānupapatti* or *sambandhānupapatti,* following the Prābhākara school, rather than *tātparyānupapatti* accepted by the Bhaṭṭa *mīmāṁsakas* and later *naiyāyikas.* As a result of this even instances of *upalakṣaṇa* like 'protect the curd from crows'

37

could be excluded from *lakṣaṇā* and if necessary put under *vyañjanā* (but not *dhvani* which is concerned solely with charming suggested sense).

The *mīmāṁsakas* distinguish between secondary significative power based on common qualities or similarity (metaphor) and that based on other relations *(metonymy);* the former is called *gaunī* and the latter *lakṣaṇā (Tantravārtika* II.p.354). The other schools consider both as *lakṣaṇā* and treat them as its two varieties.

Ānandavardhana and his followers consider that the motive element in an intentional *lakṣaṇā* is apprehended by *vyañjanā vyāpāra* only. It cannot be *abhidhā,* the primary significatory power because there is no *saṅketa* or convention connecting a word and its suggested meaning. In the case of the example 'the village on the Ganges' *(gaṅgāyām ghoṣah),* the suggested sense may be coolness and sanctity as far as the orthodox Hindu is concerned; but for a foreign tourist the statement may suggest facilities for swimming, boating or fishing. The suggested meaning is vague and flexible and depends on contextual factors. Hence the purpose of resorting to an intentional transfer cannot be included under *abhidhā* which is based on the direct relationship between a word and its referent and is fairly fixed.

Nor can the suggested element intended by the speaker and understood by the listeners in a *lakṣaṇā* be brought under the function of *lakṣaṇā* itself, if we accept that *lakṣaṇā* must have three conditions, namely, incongruity of the literal meaning, some relation between the primary and secondary meaning and a special motive or sanction by usage as accepted by the *ālaṁkārikas.* The power of *lakṣaṇā* is exhausted when the incompatibility of the primary sense is removed by adopting a secondary meaning somehow related to the primary meaning and should not be extended further to the motive element.

The *mīmāṁsakas* and the *naiyāyikas* define *lakṣaṇā* in such a way as to include even the motive element under it. Mukulabhaṭṭa says that according to Bhartṛhari, an ancient *mīmaṁsaka,* one variety of *lakṣaṇā* is where there is some relation with the literal sense *(abhidheyena sambandha);* even *arthāpatti* will come under this ('Devadatta is fat; he does not eat during day time'. This implies his eating at night).

In the case of intentional metaphors like 'the village on the Ganges', the actual meaning 'the bank of the Ganges' is got through *lakṣaṇā.* But the suggested sense of coolness and sanctity comes not from 'the bank', but from 'the Ganges', so we have to go back to the primary meaning to get the suggested meaning.

Even if it is accepted that the qualities of coolness and sanctity may be got from the expression 'the village on the banks of the Ganges' *(gaṅgātīre ghoṣaḥ)*, the reader may miss it. The definite purpose of *lakṣaṇā* is to help in the process of suggestion by creating a break in the flow by the 'ungrammatically' which makes the listener to stop and think about the possible interpretations. Thus *lakṣaṇā* stimulates attention by the break of the flow. It is a kind of signal; 'Stop!.. Listen! and Look!' Hence there is a great deal of truth in the argument of Ānandavardhana that the motive element in *lakṣaṇā* does not form part of it.

Vyañjanā cannot be brought under the primary significative function *(abhidhā)* as claimed by Prabhākara's followers who are mentioned *dirghadīrgha vyāpāravādins* — those who believe in the long-continued operation of the denotative power which kept working even after denoting the primary meaning of a word, and the syntactic relation and could extend to any length needed. Just as the range of an arrow can be extended further and farther depending on the force with which it is discharged,

the range of meaning of an expression also depends on the intention. This is not acceptable to Ānanda who believes that the denotative power is exhausted when the primary meaning of the word is coveyed.

Moreover the suggested element cannot be through the primary sense. Emotions can be evoked by the sound of music and the sight of dance where no expressed sense is involved. The emotive element in language can never be explained in terms of the primary meaning or even the metaphorical sense of words. The suggested meanings and the literal meanings arc comprehended almost simultaneously in such cases. *Vyañjanā* has to be accepted to explain the emotive significance of language.

In the first *uddyota* Ānandavardhana says that the relation between the literal meaning and the suggested meaning of an expression is similar to the relation between the word meaning and the connected sentence meaning. In the third *uddyota,* however, he says that the analogy should not be stretched; what he meant by his early statement is that the one leads to the other. Strictly speaking there is great difference between the two. The relation between the literal meaning and the suggested meaning can be said to be that between the mud and the pot. When the pot is made of mud, we cannot perceive the mud and the pot simultaneously. It is a relation of bricks and wall; when we see the wall, we cannot see the bricks separately. But in the case of the suggested meaning we can have both the literal meaning and the suggested meaning simultaneously. There is no need to conceal the literal meaning, before getting the suggested meaning.

Vyañjanā cannot be brought under inference. Inference requires invariable concomitances between the cause and the effect; a one-to-one relation is essential. There is no such fixed relation between the primary meaning and the suggested meaning.

The suggested meaning is flexible and ambiguous and depends on contextual factors. In the same situation a sentence may convey different suggested meanings to different persons. In the case of symbolic poetry what the symbol means is not always certain, in the case of *double entendre (śleṣa),* both the contextual and non-contextual meanings may be indicated by the denotative power of the words; but the figure of speech like simile suggested cannot be brought under *lakṣaṇā* or *abhidhā.*

Mahimabhaṭṭa who starts with the claim that all the instances of poetry given as examples of *dhvani* can be brought under inference itself is unable to explain one example quoted by Ānanda from Mayūra's *Sūryaśataka* where two meanings are conveyed by the words through *double entendre*; but no hint is given by the poet about the existence of the non-contextual meaning. Manimabhaṭṭa's argument is that the other meaning does not exist. But critics who know the language and have an ear for appreciation do understand the other meaning. Ambiguity is the soul of suggestion; if the suggested meaning can be got logically from the literal meaning itself, it ceases to be *vyañjanā.* Ānanda seems to have anticipated Mahimabhaṭṭa and given convincing arguments against the inclusion of *vyañjanā* under inference.

6

Some Concepts in
Ānandavardhana's Theory

Pratibhā

The concept of *pratibhā* as the primary source of poetic inspiration and as the main cause of poetry is stressed by almost all writers on literary criticism in India and has its roots in the *Ṛgveda* itself. This poetic vision is an instantaneous or timeless flash of insight, integral, indivisible and immediate and accompanied by a sense of happiness and joy. The same term has been used in various systems of Indian Philosophy like *Yoga* and in *Āgamas* almost in the same sense. Among the grammarians Bhartṛhari has discussed in detail the nature and role of *pratibhā* in communication. According to him it is on a par with the instinct in animals and is of the nature of an instantaneous flash of insight. A sentence or any complete utterance is to be taken as an integral and indivisible *sphoṭa* or symbol of an integral thought, which reveals the meaning in the mind of the listeners as a flash of intuition, whose exact nature is difficult to explain. The instinct that prompts the cuckoo to sing in the spring season, and birds to build their nests is also the basis of

language behaviour. This *pratibhā* is identified with *paśyantī* or the instructive urge which is the first stage in the manifestation of *śabdatattva* or the speech principle *parā vāg)* where there is no difference between speech and thought.

In the field of literary criticism *pratibhā* is accepted as the most important cause of poetry. The term is generally explained as 'poetic imagination', but it is also used with different overtones and emphasis. Often it is identified with poetic genius or *śakti*, explained as the natural and inborn power enabling the poet to have visions. It is analogous to the mystic vision of sages or *yogins* or even the aesthetic enjoyment of *rasa.*

The term is more often used to denote the imaginative faculty of the poet which enables him to have new ideas and images. When the poet is concentrating his attention on the theme and is fully immersed in the emotion intended to be evolved ideas and images flash into the imagination one after another in quick succession. It is this imaginative faculty that is often referred to by the term *pratibhā.*

Ānandavardhana has dealt at length with *pratibhā*; it is often identified with *śakti* or poetic power. It is this gift that makes a poet great. Even defects in craftsmanship will be submerged in the power of the poet's *pratibhā.* Endowed with this power, poets arc able to convert even ordinary ideas into real poetry. The Goddess of Speech herself will help such a poet in finding ever new ideas and expressions. The differing definitions for *pratibhā* given by critics are not incompatible with one another since they refer to the different stages in the manifestation of poetic genius in inventing ever new ideas and images and giving expression to it.

Ānandavardhana admits that his *dhvani* theory is mainly intended to help poets having real *pratibhā,* the imaginative intuition which is the essential requirement for one to be a poet.

43

The royal road of *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyañgya* will help the poet to extend his imaginative faculty (IV.3). Even ideas which have been dealt with by earlier poets can be presented in an original and fresh way by the poet of imaginative power, if he uses the suggestive method explained in the *dhvani* theory. Capacity to give delight to the man of taste *(sahṛdaya)* is the essential naure of poetry; this is through the evocation of emotional content. Evocation of emotion is possible only through suggestive method, and not by direct narration; hence the importance of the *dhvani* theory which emphasizes *rasa.* The method of communication is more important than the content.

In this world of poetry the poet is the God of creation. The universe of poetic creation depends on his imagintive genius. If he is full of love, the entire external work! seems to he endowed with love; if lie becomes detached and dispassionate, the external world also reflects his mood. A true poet can make through his imaginative power insentient objects of nature filled with emotion like living being, and make living beings behave like insentient beings. His wish is the master of his creation. A true poet's imagination transcends the natural laws of the world (*niyatikṛtaniyamarahitā,* says Mammaṭa).

If the poet has *pratibhā* images rush to his mind one after another in quick succession, when he is concentrating his mind on the *rasa* intended. Though figures of speech pertaining to the meaning, like simile, metaphor and poetic fancy seem to be difficult to be introduced, they need not require any special effort on the part of a real poet with *pratibhā.* But they should be introduced with discrimination, by keeping them subordinate to the main *rasa* intended. Ānandavardhana gives a list of five points to be observed by the poet in the proper use of figures of *arthālaṁkāras.*

(1) The figure introduced must be subordinate to the *rasa,* (2) it should not become dominant at any time; (3) The main *rasa* should always be kept in view, and the figure should be introduced when necessary, and given up when the need is over, (4) the figure of speech should not be elaborated fully or overdone, and (5) even if the figure is developed fully, care should be taken to sec that it is subordinate to the main *rasa.* These points are to be noted in cases where *rasas* are to be developed. He illustrates these points with examples from poets like Kālidāsa. Amaru and others.

In the case of *yamakas* and other figures of speech pertaining to sound, it is difficult to introduce them without any special effect. *śabdabhaṅgaśleṣa* is more difficult than *arthaśleṣa.* Anandvardhana has indulged in all sorts of *yamaka* etc. in his *Deviśataka* at the end of which he admits that it is *suduṣkara,* 'very difficult'.

Sahṛdaya—the ideal reader

Anandavardhana stresses the need for the ideal reader to equip himself to become a man of taste in order to enjoy a piece of literature properly. The imaginative sensibility for proper literary appreciation can be acquired only by a close study of classical works and by the constant practice of response to works of art. The most important element of the meaning of a poem is the emotion which is evoked through suggestion, it can be understood only by a *sahṛdaya* or a man of sensibility who can raise himself above his petty prejudice and personal predilections and appreciate things from the point of view of the poet. He is not decrying the importance of scholarship and command of the language on the pan of the readers; the literal meaning can be had only through analytical study which implies full command of the vocabulary and rhetoric. This is essential, but along with

this there must be the experience at enjoying classical poems in order to get at the heart of the poet. The mind of the reader 'must be termed to the same frequency as that of the transmitting artist. The goddess of speech exposes her full charm completely only to the deserving devotee just as a loving wife to her husband. Such an ideal *connosseur* is called *sahṛdaya* or a man of taste. This idea of an ideal reader is as old as the *Ṛgveda* and the term *sahṛdaya* is not coined by Ānandavardhana. Abhinavagupta defines it as the faculty of entering into identity with the heart *of* the poet *(kavihṛdayatādātmyāpattiyogyatā, Abhinavabhāratī,* Vol.2.p.339). His famous definition is as follows: 'a *sahṛdaya* is one who is capable of identifying with the subject-matter, as the minor of his heart has been polished by the constant study and practice at poetic appreciation and who can respond to it sympathetically, the term *sahṛdaya* is split to mean one who has similar heart as that of the poet *(samānahṛdaya).*

Ānandavardhana's view has been explained by Abhinavagupta in the above passages. Ānanda seems to have had another view also, when he says that to be a *sahṛdaya* means to be able to appreciate *rasa* properly *(rasajñatā).* He asks, 'What do you mean by a sensitive reader ? Is the prerequisite the recognition of certain conventions that apply to poetry and that bear no relation to *rasa* and *bhāva* ? Or is it a broad and subtle knowledge of the nature of poetry as consisting in *rasa., bhāva* and the like ? The final answer is a *sahṛdaya* is one who can appreciate *rasa.*'

Bharata who developed the *rasa* theory had not stressed the importance of the ideal audience to raise themselves to the level of *sahṛdaya.* His stress was on the actors to transmit the *rasa* to the audience by the power of their acting. According to him the play should please all types of people not merely the specialists.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka who came after Ānanda also stressed the need of the poet to make the reader enjoy *rasa* even passively. Bhaṭṭanayaka's theory of *rasa* realization stresses the subjective aspect of *rasa* as an aesthetic experience of the spectator. Like Ānanda, Bhaṭṭanāyaka also distinguishes poetic language from ordinary language. He postulates two functions for poetic language *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva* in addition to the primary function *abhidhā* (which includes *lakṣaṇā* also). *Bhāvakatva* is the power of universalization *(sādhāranīkarana)* which strips the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas, sthāyibhāva* etc., of their individual and personal aspects and generalizes them in the mind of the spectator endowed with the power of imagination: *bhojakatva* is the power of which the *sthāyibhāva* reaches its climax and is enjoyed by the spectator. The former is 'the aesthetic efficacy', as Ingalls calls it. and the latter is 'the enjoyment efficacy'. This enjoyment is similar to the bliss that comes from realizing one's identity with Brahman. Bhaṭṭanāyaka goes to the extent of saying that the bliss from aesthetic experience is superior to that enjoyed by the *yogins* in meditation, since the former comes automatically without any great effort unlike the latter. The difference between Ānanda's view and that of Bhaṭṭanāyaka is only in the emphasis given. One stresses the need of the spectator to rise to the level of the poet, while the other considers that the *bhojakatva* power of poetry must make itself felt by the reader, one is art active participation, while the other is a passive awareness.

Ānandavardhana gave great importance to the *sahṛdayas.* He defined the soul of poetry as that meaning which gives delight *to* the *sahṛdayas.* Poetry is defined as that expression and its meaning which gives aesthetic pleasure to the *sahṛdaya* and *sahṛdaya* is defined as one who is capable of enjoying aesthetic pleasure. Though this may seem to be a circular

approach, it shows the importance given to the ideal reader in aesthetic enjoyment. Abhinavagupla's statement that the poet and the *sahṛdaya* together form the essence of poetry, imply that poetry becomes *poetry* only when it is enjoyed by the *sahṛdaya.*

Is it necessary for the ideal reader who is a man of taste to be able to have the same or similar experience as the original poet? Should the reader's meaning be identical with the poet's meaning? Are not the *sahṛdayas* permitted to understand and appreciate a poet in a manner different from that of the poet? Ananda's definition of *sahṛdaya* as *rasajñas* (one who relishes *rasa),* shows that the reader is free to interpret the poem in a way that gives him maximum pleasure. Abhinavagupta's practice seen in his commentary also suggests his catholic mind. Often he gives different interpretations to the same poem, giving it different contexts of situation, and says that it is better to accept that interpretation which gives the reader maximum pleasure.

Ānandavardhana was an advocate *of rasa;* but realized it limitations. In one of his verses quoted in the *Dhvanyāloka* he says that after experiencing with the imaginative poetic vision capable of affording aesthetic experience and also with the intellectual powers for analysing and understanding the truth about reality, he has become exhausted, and has realized that the bliss that the devotee gets by the contemplation of God (Nārāyana) is far superior to them all.

Abhinavagupta recognized the similarity between aesthetic experience and mystical experience; but he was clear about its limitations. The mystic experience of the ultimate reality is total and complete, and the *yogin* is far beyond any form of discursive thought. Aesthetic experience gives bliss only temporarily and cannot be considered supreme bliss; though it is superior to worldly happiness.

The ideal *sahṛdaya* must be able to respond adequately to the valorous *vīra rasa* as well as to the frightful *bhayānaka rasa* to the *śṛṅgāra rasa*, and to the *śānta rasa*. But authorities like Abhinavagupta sometimes state that a naturally brave *sahṛdaya* may not be able to respond to the *bhayānaka rasa,* and that the *śānta rasa* may not be within the reach of the ordinary *sahṛdaya.* This may seem to be a *prima facie* view, and not the final view. Should not a *sahṛdaya* be capable of self effaccment, and be able to shift this attitude to participate actively to any emotional situation described by a poet, is not temporary suspension of disbelief essential while enjoying a poem?

If the *sahṛdaya's* mind is conditioned by (the nature of the classical works he has repeatedly enjoyed and appreciated, there cannot be uniformity in the mental conditioning of literature, and hence tastes may differ. Still *rasajñatā* or the innate capacity to respond to emotional appeal is an essential quality of a *sahṛdaya.*

A *sahṛdaya* has to analyse a poem and try to get the maximum aesthetic charm, by interpreting under different situational contexts, if the context is not clear as in the case of stray verses. Taking the verse *'lāvaṇyadraviṇavyayo na gaṇitaḥ* — traditionally ascribed to the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, he examines the general view that the poem is an instance of *vyājastuti,* and finds it not quite satisfactory. Then he tries to interpret it as an *aprastutapraśaṁsā,* suggesting the poet's lamentation that his philosophical theories are not properly appreciated since he has not got followers of that calibre. Quoting a genuine work of Dharmakīrti where the same complaint is narrated. Ānanda shows that this supports the ascription of the poem to Dharmakīrti himself. The verse is apparently about a young beautiful girl who is suffering from lack of a worthy lover. This is to be taken as an allegory, suggesting the lament

by a man proud of his talents who feels that others fail to recognize his merits.

Vāmana had belittled the importance of stray verses, saying that there will be no scope for full delineation of *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* etc., in a stray verse and *rasa* cannot be fully developed. But Ānandavardhana was fond of the stray verses like those of Amaru, Bhallata, and Hāla and quotes profusely such verses in illustration of excellent poetry. Abhinavagupta who comments on them often tries to interpret them under different contexts and see which context will yield the maximum suggestive charm. He says that the absence of definite contextual factors in stray verses gives an opportunity for the critic to imagine and find out the best context for them.

Aucitya (Propriety)

Ānandavardhana lays great stress on the all-comprehensive propriety *aucitya)* in poetry. A would be poet who has studied the rules of Bharata and others, and followed the tradition of the great poets of the past, must still take great care not to relax from the proprieties with respect to the *vibhāvas* etc., pertaining to *rasa,* even though lie is really endowed with the power of genius. The plot may be traditional or invented: when selecting a plot from well-known *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* care should be taken to see that there is scope for the delineation of *rasa,* and while arranging the plot he has to describe only those *vibhāvas* etc., which are conducive to the development of the *rasa* intended. If the plot selected contains episodes which are not in keeping with the intended *rasa,* they should be set aside, and new episodes invented by the poet himself should be introduced. This is illustrated by the *Sākuntala* of Kālidāsa. The introduction of Durvāsā's curse, and the signet ring is quite appropriate in the plot. In the case of invented plots, the poet has to be much more

careful, since there is the likelihood of the poet stumbling. The division of the plot into five *sandhis,* and their subdivision into 64 *sandhyaṅgas* laid down by Bharata are to reveal the intended *rasa,* and they should not be brought in the plot merely to fulfil the requirement of the text book. Only those *sandhyaṅgas* which are in keeping with the intended *rasa* should be introduced. Ānandavardhana finds fault with the author of the *Venīsaṁhāra* for introducing a love scene between Duryodhana and his wife Bhānumatī in the second act, since this is not appropriate to the *vīra rasa.*

Ānanda says that in his work *Arjunacarita* he has introduced descriptions of Arjuna's victorious battles in *pātāla,* though they are not found in the original *Mahābhārata,* but this introduction of the new episode is quite appropriate to the *rasa* namely *vīra.* Ānanda, however warns poets against introducing episodes which are *against* the traditional story. He approves the standpoint of Yaśovarman author of the *Rāmābhyudaya* who claims that he has not made any drastic changes in the original plot for his drama *(Kathāmārge na cātikramaḥ).*

In the case of the plot invented by the poet there is no question of eschewing unnecessary elements and adding new ones; the entire plot should be so constructed that the intended *rasa* is fully taken care of.

The activities of the hero described must be quite in keeping with his nature; gods and heroic, character in the *Purāṇas* can be described as possessing the power to travel to the heaven or *pātāla,* but not an ordinary mortal king. In the case of love, the gods could be described as behaving like high class human characters. The heroic deeds traditionally ascribed to King Sātavāhana can be treated within the traditional limits. Following the recognized proprieties is the essence of *rasa* delineation.

The main point is that the matters described should be such that there is no breach in the credence of the audience.

It may be admitted that in the case of love among divine characters. the general rule is that it must be described as similar to that among the high class society. Sex should not be shown on the stage because it is indecent and vulgar. Ānanda says that even in pure literature depiction of vulgar sexual enjoyment is not proper. In the case of divine couple it is much more so. Though literature provides examples of indecent sex even in the case of great poets (like Kālidāsa in canto 8 of the *Kumārasambhava),* the inappropriateness is concealed by the poetic genius of the writer. In the case of lesser poets the blemish will be quite conspicuous.

It may be noted that in spite of this warning, later poets like Jayadeva indulged in the same way in his *Gītagovinda.* Perhaps *sādhārapīkarana* may be an answer to this problem. When the audience enjoys the *rasa,* he is enjoying it from a new world of make relief, in a generalized form. Ānanda was not aware of the *sādhāranīkarana* theory advocated later by Bhaṭṭanāyaka; but even Abhinavagupta who accepted *sādhāranīkarana* in the *rasa* theory does not try to defend Kālidāsa. Ānanda knew that this impropriety docs not mar the aesthetic enjoyment; so he says that the vulgarity in such cases does not appear as such, because it is concealed by the poet's skill in craftsmanship *(śakti).*

Alaṁkāras (Proper use of Figures of Speech)

Ānandavardhana has pointed out in detail the proper use of figures of speech in literature. He has enunciated several principles all of which can be brought under one heading, namely, that the figures of speech should be subordinate to the main *rasa,* and helpful in its delineation and should not require any special effort. The figures should be *aprthagyatnanirvartya,*

'capable of being delineated without any special effort on the part of the poet' and being understood and enjoyed by the reader without any special effort. This is quite possible for a poet of vision and imagination in the case of figures of speech pertaining to meaning (*Dh.A.* p.221-22). Images rush to the mind of a good poet with imaginative power as in the case of Bāna in the *Kādambarī* when the hero Candrāpīḍa meets the heroine. But in the case of figures of speech pertaining to sound like *yamaka* and *citrabandha* it is difficult even for a capable poet, especially when the *rasa* depicted is love-in-separation or *karuṇa* which are very delicate. Figures of speech pertaining to the meaning such as simile, metaphor etc., can be used judiciously so that they are not overdone, and we kept subordinate to the *rasa* intended and helpful in its delineation.

Ānandavardhana's statement about the use of *yamaka* in good poetry where delicate *rasa* is to be delineated appears to be quite positive and definite. But Abhinavagupta and Jagannātha Paṇḍita seem to concede that there is no harm in the use of *yamaka* etc., if such figures of speech could be effected spontaneously without any special effort on the pail of the poet. In his commentary to the *yamaka* poem *Ghaṭakarpara* which is traditionally ascribed to Kālidāsa. Abhinavagupta says that Ānanda's statement should not be taken as a royal command (*rājājñā)* and that what is meant is that the poet should see that no obstruction to the evocation of *rasa* is in his poem. Even *śleṣa* as in the case of *aśoka* etc., does not produce any jarring effect on the listerner.

We may also note that Ānandavardhana does not seem to follow his own rules regarding *yamakas* and *citrakāvyas*. In his *Devīśataka* he indulges in all sorts of *yamakas* and *citrabandhas*. But we find that it is with simple, common words, without long compounds, that Ānanda is able to achieve his effects. Even

Professor Ingalls admits that the *Devīśataka* belongs to the acceptable type of *citrakāvyas*. He has written an appreciative paper on this poem in *Ernest Bender Felicitation Volume,* where he claims that 'the *yamakas* of the poem are musical and the *citrabandhas* extremely clever'.

Saṅghaṭanā

Saṅghaṭanā or the texture of a poem depends on the nature of compounding. There are three types of *Saṅghaṭanā* : (1) with long compounds, (2) without compound words, and (3) with medium type of compounds. Earlier writers had associated *saṅghaṭanā* with *guṇas*. Thus the *guṇa* called *ojas* was defined as characterized by long compounds, Ānanda was the first writer to show with illustrations that long compounds are not essential for the quality of *ojas*. A given *saṅghaṭanā* does not necessarily mean a particular *rasa*. The *Venīsaṁhāra* verse *cañcadbhuja...* (1.23) has long compounds; but the verse *'yo yah śastram bibharti'* of the same *nāṭaka* (3.32) does not contain any long compound word; still both are appropriate for the *raudra rasa* delineated.

Ānanda says that the texture or *saṅghaṭanā* depends on the qualities (*guṇas).* Either both are identical or one is dependent on the others. Ānanda had already shown that *guṇas* depend on the *rasa* delineated, hence the *saṅghaṭanā* will also be dependent on *rasa*. Regarding the use of proper *saṅghaṭanā,* propriety with reference to the speaker and the matter stated and also the genre in which one is to be taken into consideration. Both the examples cited for the *raudrarasa,* one with long compounds and the other without compound are appropriate; as pointed out by Abhinavagupta. "From the long compound, flowing in an uninterrupted stream, and allowing the bearer no pause in all its course, there results an apprehension of the whole scene as unity

upto the representation of the broken-thighed Suyodhana. This serves to intensify the impressions of Bhīma's violence." Regarding the second verse he remarks, "Here the anger of the speaker rises to the highest pitch by a progression from word to word through meanings which, being presented separately, are reflected upon by the hearer in succession. So the very absence of compounds acts as a cause of rising excitement" (Translation by Ingalls).

Guṇībhūta Vyaṅgya

According to the classification of poetry by Ānandavardhana *dhvanikāvya* is that where the expression and its literal meaning occupy a subordinate position and suggest some charming sense (an idea, a figure of speech or a *rasa)*. In cases where the suggested sense is subordinate to the literal sense as in the case of figures of speech like *samāsokti* and *paryāyokta* as well as in *rasavad alaṁkāra* etc. where the emotional factors are not predominant, but add charm to the literal sense. Ānandavardhana gives the name *guṇībhūta vyaṅgya*. Poetry which does not contain any suggested sense cannot be considered good poetry; still such poems also exist, and therefore they are called *citrakāvyas.*

It was Mammaṭa (*Kāvyaprakāśa* (1.4-5) who spoke of *guṇībhūta vyaṅgya* as second rate poetry *(madhyama kāvya)* for the first time. Many scholars, traditional as well as modern, took it for granted that this is the view *of* Ānandavardhana. S.K. De wrote. 'By the side of the *dhvani kāvya* in which the suggest sense is predominant we have poetry of second rate excellence designated *guṇībhūa-vyaṅgya kāvya* in which the unexpressed plays a subordinate part' *(History of Sanskrit Poetics,* II.p.162) Ingalls has clearly exposed this error. He says "This error should be corrected, for nowhere in the *Dhvanyāhloka* does Ānanda

characterize the poetry of *guṇībhūta vyaṅgya* as second rate" (p.23).

Ānanda had pointed out the evasive nature of the distinction between *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyangya,* The question as to which gives more charm to the sensitive critics the expressed or the suggested is not easy *to* decide, and depends on the effect produced—which is more charming *(cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vācya-vyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānyavivakṣā).* Ānanda says (111.40) 'This type of poetry called *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* may take on the nature of *dhvani* when regarded from the point of view of the importance of *rasa.* A poem as a whole may be an instance *of rasa dhvani,* but the parts may be instance *of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya.* An emotional factor may be subordinate to another *rasa* which is predominant.' Earlier writers had pointed out the existence of some suggested element in figures of speech like *aprastutapraśaṁsā, paryāyokta* and *samāsokti.* Ānanda did not want to put them on a par with *rasa-dhvani.* Perhaps it is this historical reason that prompted Ānanda to have *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* as a separate type of poetry. Many of the examples given by Ānanda for this type of poetry are 'among the most beautiful stanzas in the whole work. Mahimabhaṭṭa criticized this classification saying that if suggestion is the soul of poetry, there is no scope for *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* ('lifeless poetry'). The classification of the subordinate suggested type which is found fully discussed in Mammaṭa's work, is suggested in *Dhvanyāloka* itself.

Appendix-I

Dhvanisaṅgraha
(Summary of *dhvani* Text)

Chapter I

1. After making obeisance to my teacher īśana. 1 am preparing a summary of the *dhvani* (text) in a manner suitable for learning, as stairs for descent into the ocean of the neclar of suggestion.

2. By the benedictory verse in the beginning, the author of the *vṛtti,* who is already satisfied (after performing obeisance to God), calls for the favour of God in accomplishing the desires of the commentators and readers.

3. The term *dhvani* may mean the suggested sense, the fuction of suggestion, the poem (containing a suggested sense), the expression or the literal meaning (as the suggestor), since it can be interpreted as 'that which is suggested', 'the function of suggestion', 'that where there is suggestion' and 'that which suggests'.

4. In this case there are differing views based on the mistaken notion of the absence (of *dhvani):* (1) It is not

a cause of aesthetic beauty since it is distinct from *guṇa* and *alaṁkāra.*

5. (2) Anything other than *guṇa, alaṁkāra* etc. cannot be a cause of aesthetic beauty, and (3) Even if it is a cause of aesthetic beauty, it is minor and does not deserve (special) consideration.

6. Thus there are at first three disagreeing views based on the mistaken notion. Some others who are not capable of discrimination consider *dhvani* as *bhakti* or *lakṣaṇā* due to uncertainty.

7. Some others, because of their incapacity for giving a definition, consider it as something to be experienced. The removal of these five disagreeing views is by explaining the real nature (of *dhvani).*

8. The purpose of this (explanation) is the aesthetic pleasure on the part of the *sahṛdayas*; the relation regarding the teacher and the taught is clear, though not expressed.

9. With ideas such as these the wise author of the *dhvani* text gives the initial verse to indicate what is intended to be done.

10. Then by the second *kārikā,* which takes together the literal and the suggested meanings, he lays the foundation for the intended definition.

11. Taking out the literal sense (out of these two), separately since it is like the body (of poetry) it is kept as subordinate as it has already been defined by earlier writers.

12. Then inferring the existence of the suggested sense since it appears (distinct from the beauty of the parts), its distinction from the literal sense is established with the help of examples.

13. Thus by the difference in form (between the literal and suggested meanings), one being positive while the other is negative etc., and by the difference in the scope (between the two), the clear distinction between the literal and suggested senses is established.

14. Then through the episode in the epic (of the *Rāmāyaṇa),* the existence (and importance) of this (suggested sense) is established; and another argument in favour of the existence of the suggested sense is given.

15. As it *(dhvani)* is understood only by the well-read and experienced *sahṛdayas,* the existence of the suggested sense is again established, on the basis of the difference in the persons who can appreciate the literal sense and those who can appreciate the suggested sense.

16. Thus establishing the existence (of *dhvani),* its importance is also established by saying that the greatness of a poet is based on his resorting to the suggested sense.

17. The suggested sense is of two kinds, the ordinary and that found only in literature. The ordinary (worldly type) is again of two varieties; of these the idea *(vastu)* is in the form of affirmation, negation etc.

18. The other is called by the term *alaṁkāra* (figure of speech) *dhvani,* since formerly it was called by that term *alaṁkāra* (when it was expressed). The *rasa* etc., can be produced only through literature and cannot be directly expressed.

19-20. Thus the threefold form (of *dhvani)* is stated with illustrations. Then by saying that the greatness of a poet is based on his composing works full of suggested elements, the importance of *dhvani* is brought out. Though *dhvani* is the predominant thing, the literal

meaning and the expression are accepted 'as a means for it'. This is made clear with illustrations.

21. Here (in the suggested sense) there is no special effort (needed) in understanding through stages, the word meaning first and then the sentence meaning etc, because of the quickness in the understanding of the two. Thus the charm of *dhvani* is pointed out.

22-23. Thus after dealing with the *sadbhāva* of *dhvani* which refers to its existence, excellence and importance, for establishing the existence of what is to be defined, it is introduced in the objective case in the sentence *tam artham (kārikā* 13) of the definition.

24. After setting forth the special characteristic (of *dhvani),* its definition is given first to reject the opposing views.

25. The terms *artha* (literal meaning) and *śabda* (the expression) are given separately (in the definition), since they are important in the suggestion (separately); but since the two are invariably together, the term *vyaṅktaḥ* (in the dual number) is used (in the definition) keeping them together.

26. The terms *sva* and *artha,* applied to *artha* and *śabda* respectively, and being kept subordinate (as given in the definition) make clear the distinction (of *Dhvani)* from those *(Guṇa, Alaṁkāra* etc.) which depend only on the limbs of poetry.

27. Here by the two meanings (literal and suggested) got on the strength of the contextual factors like the speaker etc., the function of both *śabda* and *artha* in making the suggested sense predominant is made clear.

28. Qualities, like *alaṁkāras,* are embodied in *śabda* and *artha* and are occasional (not invariably connected with

poetry); how can they be capable of revealing its charm, if its soul itself is non-existent?

29. Though in (figures of speech like) *Samāsokti* etc., the existence of the suggested sense is quite clear and obvious, this sense gives up its importance and acts on its own accord to embellish the literal sense.

30. Explaining thus with illustrations, the figure of speech *Ākṣepa* is discussed and the description is elaborated till the consideration of the varieties of *Viśeṣokti.*

31. If the suggested sense is more charming than the literal sense in *Paryāyokta,* then it may be included in *Dhvani; Dhvani* which has a wider scope cannot be identified with this *Alaṁkara.*

32. After establishing this, it is shown with examples that even when suggested ideas are introduced in some *alaṁkāras,* these suggested elements cannot by any means be taken as the soul.

33. By the term *viśeṣa* (in the expression *kāvyaviśeṣaḥ* of the definition) the extraordinary nature of this *(dhvani)* is indicated. Hence it is proper to give a subordinate place to the elements (like *alaṁkāra)* previously well-known (to earlier writers).

34. How can those people, whose life is spent in (looking for) the beauty of the literal meaning and the expression, move on the path of *dhvani* whose essence is based on the relation of the suggestor and the suggested?

35. Thus rejecting (the critics of *dhvani),* the authority for the speakers in favour of *(dhvani)* is stated. This term *(dhvani)* is not somehow made arbitrarily.

36-37. The grammarians have given the term *dhvani* previously to the letters which are destroyed soon after they are produced. to that which depends on the last letter, (3)

61

also to the *sphoṭa,* (4) to the meaning which is revealed by the *sphoṭa:* and also (5) to the function (of revelation); and wise men *(sahṛdayas)* who accept their views use the term *(dhvani)* to all the five things, following the same principle.

38. To the two kinds of *avivakṣitavācya (dhvani)* and also (the two kinds) of the other *(vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani),* there are two subdivisions as *asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* (where the order of sequence between the literal and suggested meanings is imperceptible) and *saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* (where the order of sequence is perceptible).

39. With further subdivisions, this great topic is of very wide scope and it is proper that it should be defined.

40. Establishing this and completely rejecting the arguments for the absence of *dhvani* and stating that it is worthy of pursuit by those interested, the *bhāktavāda* (theory including *dhvani* under *bhakti* or *lakṣaṇā)* is taken for discussion.

41-42. *Bhakti* means (1) qualities like similarity etc., considered to exist in the literal meaning; (2) *Bhāga* or part of the qualities like sharpness, known through the secondary *gauṇī vṛtti* (metaphor based on common quality); (3) *śraddhā* or concentration on the intended meaning, and (4) *Bhaṅga* or break or incongruity of the primary meaning. The meaning got through that *(bhakti)* is called *bhākta* and includes meanings got through *lakṣaṇāvṛtti* and *gauṇī-vṛtti.*

43. How can *dhvani* be of the form of *gauṇīvṛtti,* since the two are different in form ? *Lakṣaṇā* does not function in all cases of *dhvani.*

44. Even when it *(lakṣaṇā)* functions in some cases (of *dhvani).* it has only the function of indication, since it

remains on the third stage and indicates the difference only.

45. Here this *(dhvani)* is not *lakṣaṇā* because of the defects of *avyāpti* (underpervasion) and *ativyāpti* (over-pervasion).

46. Suggestion belongs to the fourth stage and regarding the purpose (for which *lakṣaṇā* is resorted to) there is no incongruity (of the literal meaning); hence how can *lakṣaṇā* comes in that case ?

47. Thus the different views about its absence being rejected, and the definition being pointed out, and because of the impossibility of its being included in *lakṣaṇā,* the general definition given in the *kārikā* is explained by the *vṛttikāra* and now a summary of it is given here.

Chapter II

1. Now the author of the *vṛtti,* wishing to enumerate the varieties (of *dhvani)* without deviating from what is given in the text (of the *kārikā),* first recapitulates what he has spoken earlier and indicates the connection depending on the *kārikās* themselves.

2. Wishing to speak about the varieties of the *avivakṣitavācya* type of *dhvani* (where the literal sense is not intended), the two varieties in the literal sense are discussed for opening the problem.

3. Since the definitions (of these varieties) are indicated by the etymological meanings of the terms themselves, steps are taken only to give illustrations for these two varieties.

4. The term *avivakṣitavācya* (the literal meaning being not intended) is applicable in the case of the former (i.e. *arthāntara saṁkramitavācya* — the literal meaning being

transferred to another sense) since the literal sense is unnecessary there, and also in the case of the latter *(atyantatiraskṛta-vācya,* the literal meaning being completely rejected) since the literal sense is incongruous; both these are based on *lakṣaṇā.*

5. The general definition of *dhvani* is (based on) the predominance (of the suggested sense) over the literal meaning; it applies in the case of the former pair (of *avivakṣitavācya)* since it is not intended in the context, and in the case of the latter pair (*vivakṣitānyaparavācya)* since it is aimed at something else there.

6. If an objection is raised that 'intention' and 'aiming at something else' are mutually contradictory, the answer is that the literal meaning is here intended as aiming at something else.

7. The term *alakṣyakramavyaṅgya* (with interceptible sequence) itself indicates its definition; so also the other variety *(saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya,* where the sequence is perceptible).

8. Where the delineation of factors like *vṛtti, rīti, guṇa,* metre, *alaṁkāra* etc. is subordinate to the *rasa,* that alone is the wide scope of *dhvani.*

9. Having established this, the *rasavadalaṁkāra* is taken up for discussion. Some people do not know the difference between *rasa (dhvani)* and *(rasavad) alaṁkāra.*

10. Some people consider that *rasa* when associated with inanimate objects is *(rasavad) alaṁkāra.* Where *rasa* and other emotional factors are subordinate, the literal meaning being more important.

11. And when they are mixed up with other *alaṁkāras* or otherwise, that is the path of *rasavad (alaṁkāra);* when

rasa etc.. are predominant, that is the other (i.e. *rasa dhvani).*

12. Thus demonstrating with illustrations, and establishing according to his own views *(rasa)* as the predominant factor, the difference in its relation with the subordinate elements is explained.

13. There (in poetry) *guṇas* are the essential quality of the soul of poetry (i.e. *rasa),* and are really inherent in it; they are associated figuratively to the body (of poetry) just as qualities like valour arc associated figuratively to the body (of poetry) (though strictly they belong to the soul).

14. The *alaṁkāras* are attached to the limbs and are (only) helpful to the soul indirectly. Analysing the well-known ten-fold classification of *guṇas* thus.

15-16. And rejecting it on the grounds that (1) some of them are included in the three *guṇas* enumerated. (2) some are really defects (3) and some are only absence of some defects, rules are given regarding the relation to the *rasas* in the case of the *guṇas, mādhurya, ojas* and *prasāda* which arc figuratively associated to the limbs (of poetry, namely the literal meaning and the expression); *mādhurya* (sweetness) is associated with the *rasas śṛṅgāra* and *karuṇa; ojas* is attached to the *vīra rasa* : and *prasāda* is ordained in all *rasas.*

17. The occasional nature of occasional defects like *śrutiduṣṭa* (harshness to the ear) becomes clear only according to the method explained by us, as to be avoided (only) in *rasa dhvani.*

18. Thus is described the *dhvani* of the *asaṁlakṣyakrama* type (where the order of sequence between the literal sense and the suggested sense is imperceptible). It is

(generally) considered as one, since its (possible) varieties are innumerable.

19-20. (For) *śṛṅgāra* (Love) itself is first of all of two kinds, love in separation and love in union (*saṁbhoga* and *vipralaṁbha*); through the combination of various subordinate elements of itself and its varieties, and through the differences in place, time etc., it becomes limitless. So also in the case of other *rasas* where is the limit (of varieties) depending on (such) differences?

21. In this connection are discussed the rules regarding the treatment of the subordinate parts, both external and internal, which serve the soul *(rasa)* one after another.

22. Since the *guṇas* are intrinsically associated with the *rasa* (through the relation of inherence), they are not treated separately. In the case of *alaṁkāras,* though helpful through the subordinate parts *(śabda* and *artha),*

23. It is difficult to give any rule, neither deficient nor excessive, regarding their occasional occurrence. First of all in all varieties of *śṛṅgāra,* when they became predominant, continuous *anuprāsa* or alliteration is clearly a mistake and does not increase the charm; so also the delineation of *yamaka* etc.

24. Which is difficult to be accomplished, in the case of *śṛṅgāra* as the predominant *(aṅgin)* and especially its *vipralaṁbha* variety (love-in-separation), since it is extremely delicate.

25. Figures of speech like *rūpaka* which are intrinsic (to *rasa)* and can be accomplished without any separate effort will add to the charm if it is not overdeveloped, or made subordinate (to the main *rasa)* even if well developed.

26. Thus adding examples and counter examples, the confusion in (taking the subordinate elements as the

soul is removed; then the *asaṁlakṣyakaimavyaṅgya* type of *dhvani* is discussed.

27-29. Though there is an order of sequence between the *vibhāva* etc., which form the literal meaning and the *rasa* etc. which form the suggested meaning, similar to the relation between the light and the pot (revealed by it), that (order of sequence) is not noticed because of the speed in the enjoyment of *rasa*; and the enjoyment of the *rasa,* though integral and indivisible as in (he case of (enjoying the) *pānaka* drink, takes place gradually (step by step). The *asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type of *dhvani* is thus described.

30-31. After the literal meaning has been understood, it leads to rest consequently on the other charming meaning on the basis of external circumstances, on the analogy of the sound of a bell and its resonance; there the change in the (significative) power is very clear. Being based (1) on the power of the expression and (2) on the literal meaning, there are two types of *saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya dhvani.* Similar is the case in the *vivakṣītānyaparavācya* vareity of *dhvani* also.

32-33. When the expressive power of an expression has exhausted its function by indicating the (contextually) relevant meaning, the expression moves of its own accord to suggest an *alaṁkāra* by some other power which can indicate more than one meaning; this is neither the primary denotative power *(abhidhā)* nor the secondary figurative power *(lakṣaṇā).*

34. It is suggestive power (vyañjanā only), if there is no word indicative of the suggestive sense; there similarity is to be assumed between the two unconnected senses (one contextual and the other non-contextual, both being

indicated by the expressive power of the homonymous expression).

35. This is the argument in the case of *upamā* (as *alaṁkāra dhvani*); in figures of speech like *virodha* also the same argument holds good. Thus *dhvani* based on *śabdaśakti* (the power of the expression) is explained.

36-37. Among the given varieties of the established two-fold *dhvani,* when the (literal) meaning, by its own capacity, subordinates itself and suggests another meaning, without using any word expressive of the suggested meaning, that is called *arthaśaktimūla* type of *dhvani* (that based on the power of the literal meaning).

38. It is not to be expressed by words; it becomes redundant by being indicated through words; and then it will not be included in *dhvani,* for aesthetic charm consists in concealment.

39. Thus explaining the general definition, the varieties are now described. The two-fold classification is not only for the suggested sense; the suggester is also of two kinds.

40. Disregarding the external reality and depending on the poet's fancy alone is one type; the other (depends), on the fancy of a character created by the poet; that is the only difference (between the two types of the first variety).

41. The other variety uses external reality with appropriateness. In the resonance type of *arthaśaktinūla dhvani* another special feature is explained.

42. When the suggestion is a figure of speech, its beauty becomes two-fold; this is not only our view, for it has already been expatiated by early authorities.

43. There will be no *alaṁkāra dhvani,* if the literal meaning is not subordinated (to the *alaṁkāra);* for if subordinate, the *alaṁkāra* will only be adding beauty to the literal sense.

44. If the *alaṁkāra* is just hinted, it is only beautifying the literal figure of speech. The *alaṁkāra dhvani* exists only in cases where the literal meaning is subordinate to it.

45. Thus analysing *dhvani* under the names of various *alaṁkāras,* they are again discussed with illustrations as before.

46. Even factors that add beauty to the body can be delineated as the main thing. When an *alaṁkāra* is indicated through the literal meaning, its aim is to increase the aesthetic beauty.

47. There is a special charm when these *(alaṁkāras)* are themselves the suggesters. The pre-eminence of ideas or figures of speech is based only on the relative excellence of the aesthetic charm (experienced by the *sahṛdaya).*

48. The *avivakṣitavācya* type of *dhvani* is stated to be of two kinds on the basis of the literal meaning getting transferred elsewhere in the one case and of its being rejected in the other.

49. In the case of the *asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type, only one type was explained previously, because of the varieties being innumerable.

50. In the *saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type revealed by the denotative power of the expression, only the suggested *alaṁkāra* is taken; some take even the ideas *(vastu)* suggested (under this type) on the basis of the *vṛtti* which says 'Not merely the facts' *(na kevalam vastumātram).*

51. Similarly a vareity called *śabdārthobhayamiśra* (depending in both the expressions and the literal meaning) is also similarly taken up (by some).

52. The suggestive element based on the fancy of the poet or of a character created by the poet or which is feasible in itself can be an idea (*vastu)* or a figure of speech *(alaṁkāra)* the suggested meaning can also be of two types; an idea or a figure of speech.

53. The suggested meaning is also of two kinds-in the form of an idea or as *an alaṁkāra;* an idea or *an alaṁkāra* suggested by an idea, and these two again suggested by an *alaṁkāra.* The expansion of the varieties of *dhvani* will be made later.

54. Having described *dhvani* thus, the semblance of *dhvani* is now discussed. A meaning is not always revealed in the same manner; throughout (from beginning) to end.

55. Thus the suggested meaning can be revealed clearly or in a vague manner; when it is clearly revealed, it is *dhvani;* otherwise it is reduced to *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya.*

56. Even in the case of the *avivakṣitvācya* (type of *dhvani)* which is based on *lakṣaṇā* there is suggestion at the stage of the (revelation of the) purpose intended.

57. On the other hand there is no *dhvani* in cases where there is only a shift in meaning, in construction made artificially because of the lack of scholarship or the lack or poetic power.

58. Hence a great poet must compose (his work) making great effort to remove the defects in all cases; this is the summary of the rules.

Samples of Ānandavardhana's Writing

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(1) ध्वन्यालोके उद्धृतानि पद्यानि।

स्वेच्छाकेसरिणः स्वच्छस्वच्छायायासितेन्दवः।
त्रायन्तां वो मधुरिपोः प्रपेर्तिच्छिदो नखाः॥

Dh A. 1.1

या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुं काचित् कवीनां नवा
दृष्टिर्या परिनिष्ठतार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपश्चितीं।
ते द्वे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिशं निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं
श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमब्धिशयन त्वद्भक्तितुल्यं सुखम्॥

Dh A. p.507.9

अमी ये दृश्यन्ते ननु सुभगरूपा सफलता
भवन्त्येषां यस्य क्षणमुपगतानां विषयताम्।
निरालोके लोके कथमिदमहो चक्षुरधुना
समं जातं सर्वैर्न सममथवान्यैरवयवैः ॥

Dh A. p. 492

समुत्थिते धनुर्धनौ भयावहे किरीटिनो
महानुपप्लवोऽभवत् पुरे पुरन्दवद्विषाम् ॥

श्रवेण तस्य तु ध्वनेर्विलुप्तमूलबन्धना—
मशेषद्वैत्ययोषितां श्लथीबभूव जीवितम् ॥

Arjunacarita, Q. Locana. p. 388 (First half)
and Balapriya (Second half)

ताला जाअन्ति गुणा जाला दे सहिअएहि धेप्पन्ति ।
रइकिरणाणुग्गहिआइँ होन्ति कमलाइ कमलाइं ॥
(तदा जायन्ते गुणा यदा ते सहृदयैर्गृह्यान्ते ।
रविकिरणानुगृहीतानि कमलानि कमलानि ॥

Viṣamabāṇalītā Q. 170, Dh A

तं ताण सिरि सहोअर रअणा हरणम्मि हिअअमेकरसम् ।
बिंबाहरे पिआणं णिवेसिअं कुसुमबाणेन ॥
(तत्तेषां श्रीसहोदर रत्नाहरणे हृदयमेकरसम् ।
बिम्बाधरे प्रियाणां निवेशितं कुसुमबाणेन ॥

Viṣamabāṇalītā Q. 170, Dh A

(2) देवी शतकम्

1. अनन्त महिमव्याप्तविश्वां वेधा न वेद याम् ।
   या च मातेव भजते प्रणते मानवे दयाम्॥

2. तनापनीतक्लेशायाः सुरारिजनतापनी ।
   न तापनी तनुर्यस्यास्तुल्या ना दीनतापनी॥

3. वक्त्रपद्मा विधेर्भाति यया सर्गलयो दया ।
   या साक्षाद्या च जनितस्थिति सर्गलयोदया॥

4. याश्रिता पावनतया यातनाच्छिदनी चया ।
   याचनीया धिया मायायामायासं स्तुता श्रिया॥

5. तमांसि ध्वंसमायान्ति यस्याः स्तुत्यादरेण वः ।
   तस्याः सिध्यै धियां मातुः कल्पन्तां पादरेणवः॥

8. या दमा वनयागेन स्वाराधानयसारया।
   हरिकैतव हास्याय सायामा विजिता यया ॥

9. यायताजिविमाया सा यस्या हा बत कैरिह।
   या रसायनधारा स्वा न गेया नवमा दाया ॥

(8 read backwards becomes 9)

10. सा भावक्षालवर्या नुतविभवि तनुर्या वलक्षावभासा
    जानानस्याशयप्रा नवनलिनवनप्रायशस्याननाजा।
    सातं वर्माननस्था रहसि रसिहरस्थाननर्मावतंसा
    पायादक्ता रणत्रा मतनमन तम—
    त्राणरक्ता दयापा ॥

40. सुरसुरचितचित नवनव भवभव नानादरादराये ये।
    लयलयचरणौ चरणौ न नमामि नतेन नमामि न ते ॥

46. मेने नूनमनेन मानन मुमानाम्मा नु मानोन्मना
    नुन्नेनोनमने निमानममुना नो नाम नानानुमे।
    मौनेनाममान निम्नमननो नामिनानूनिमे
    मुन्निन्नानमा नमी मुनिमनो मानाननोन्नामिनि ॥

86. तत्त्वं वीतावततुत्त्वं ततवती ततः।
    वित्तं वित्तव वित्तवं वीतावीतवतां बत ॥

103. क्लेशोन्माथकरी सतां भवहरा नन्दैकहेतो गुरु—
     र्माता त्वं जगतां भवन्ति विधवाः सर्वे तवानुग्रहात्।
     दुर्गे न क्वचिदेव सदिति जनस्त्वद्भक्तिपूताशयः
     स्तुतया भर्तुरर्भि येति विबुधैस्त्वं स्तूयसे श्रीरिव ॥

104. येनानन्द कथायां त्रिदशानन्दे च लालिता वाणी।
     तेन सुदुष्करमेतत् स्तोत्रं देव्याः कृतं भक्तया ॥

101. देव्या स्वप्नोद्दमादिष्टदेवीशतक संज्ञया।
     देशितानुपमामाधा दतो नोणसुतो नुतिम् ॥

73

(3) ध्वन्यालोकवृत्तिः

1. तस्य हि ध्वनेः स्वरूपं सकल सत्कविकाव्योपनिषद्भूतमतिरमणीयमणीयसीभिरपि चिरन्तन काव्यलक्षण विधायिनां बुद्धिभिरनुन्मीलितपूर्वम्, अथ च रामायण महाभारतप्रभृतिनि लक्ष्ये सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धव्यवहारं लक्षयतां सहृदयानामानन्दो मनसि लभतां प्रतिष्ठामिति प्रकाश्यते।

(pp. 35, 38)

2. ओजसः कथमनियतसंघटना शब्दाश्रयत्वम्। नँ समासा संघटना कदाचिदोजसः आश्रयतां प्रतिपद्यते। उच्यते—यदि न प्रसिद्धिमात्रग्रह दूषितं चेतस्तदत्रापि न न ब्रूमः। ओजसः कथमसमासा संघटना नाश्रयः। यतो रौद्रादीन् हि प्रकाशयतः काव्यस्य दीप्तिरोज इति प्राक् प्रतिपादितम्। तच्चोजो यद्यसमासायामपि संघटनायां स्यात् तत् को दोषो भवेत्। न चाचारुत्वं सहृदयसंवेद्यमस्ति।

(pp. 315-16)

3. प्रथमे हि विद्वासो वैयाकरणाः व्याकरणमूलत्वत् सर्वविद्यानाम्। ते च श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति। तथैवान्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिभिः सूरिभिः काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिभिः वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्रः शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यो व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्याद् ध्वनिरित्युक्तः।

(pp. 132-5)

74

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